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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is before the Court on a Petition by appellant/defendant City of South
Jordan (the "City") requesting leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of the Third
District Court, State of Utah ("Petition"). That interlocutory order granted
appellee/plaintiff Daniel Pearson's ("Mr. Pearson") Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and denied the City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This Court
granted the Petition. R. 277. Jurisdiction here is pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Did the district court err in its analysis of Utah Code Ann. §

10-3-1105?
Standard of Review: This issue involves applying Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 to the facts of Mr. Pearson's employment. A district court's interpretation of a
Utah statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Olson v. Utah Dep }t ofHealth,
2009 UT App 3035 ^ 9, 221 P.3d 836.
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved in the parties' cross-motions
for partial summary judgment. See R. 24-29, 221-24 (Pearson's PSJMem.); R. 47-51,
201-06 (City's PS J Mem.), and in the parties' oral arguments at hearing (R. 380-410)
(Hrg. Trans.). It also is preserved in the district court's Memorandum Decision (R. 22529), and its subsequent Order granting Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgment, and denying the City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Order on
Summary Judgment") (R. 231 -34).
2.

Issue: Did the district court err in its application of Utah Code Ann. §

10-3-1105, including its finding that Mr. Pearson was not at-will under that statute, and
granting his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment?
Standard of Review: Review of a summary judgment determination is "'for
correctness, granting no deference to the [district] court's legal conclusions.'" Salt Lake
County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, \ 14, 234 P.3d 1105 (citation omitted). The
appellate court will "determine only whether the [district] court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the [district] court correctly held that there were no disputed
issues of material fact." Id. (citation omitted). "The proper interpretation and application
of a statute is a question of law which [is reviewed] for correctness, affording no
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913,
914-15 (Utah 1998). See also, Standard of Review, Issue No. 1, supra.
Preservation of Issue: Relevant facts of Mr. Pearson's job history and status are
set forth in: (1) Mr. Pearson's summary judgment memoranda (R. 23-24, 219-21); (2) the
City's summary judgment memoranda (R. 43-46), and (3) the transcript of the oral
argument on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment (R. 380-410). The
district court's ruling as to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is preserved in its Memorandum
Decision (R. 225-29) and subsequent Order on Summary Judgment (R. 231-34).

vii
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III.

STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE

Statutes of central importance to this appeal are set forth below in relevant part. In
addition, copies of statutes and rules of central importance are attached as Exhibit 1 in the
Addendum to this Brief ("City's Addendum").
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (enacted 1977) (version at hiring) (R. 161).
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the
police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents,
shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge
or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (effective May 3, 2004) (version at termination).
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension
of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

an officer appointed by the mayor or other person exercising
executive power in the municipality;
a member of the municipality's police department or fire department
in a first or second class city;1
a police chief of the municipality;
a deputy police chief of the municipality;
a fire chief of the municipality;
a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
a head of a municipal department;
a deputy of a head of a municipal department;...

Employees of police and fire departments in cities of the first and second class
that choose to have a civil service commission are governed by Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1001 through -1013. The City of South Jordan has a population of slightly more
than 50,000, and is a city of the third class. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-301.
viii
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3.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1002, -1012, -1012.5 (classified civil service in cities
of first and second class).2
(1) The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment
now existing or hereafter created in or under the police department and the fire
department of each first or second class city that establishes a civil service
commission, except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of the police and
fire departments, and assistant chiefs of the police department in cities of the first
and second class, and the members of the board of health of the departments.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002 (emphasis added).
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided
in Section 10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the
department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform duties, or failure to
observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the
suspended or discharged person to the civil service commission.
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012.
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals for review....
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918

(Laws 2003) (Chief of police or marshal in a
city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or
town).

The chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or
town:
(2) may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or
marshal, appoint assistants to the chief of police or marshal.

2

Seen.l, supra.
ix
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-919

(Laws 2003) (Powers, duties, and obligations
of police chief, marshal, and their assistants
in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or
town).

The chief of police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or
fifth class or town shall have all of the powers, rights, and duties respectfully
conferred on such officers in Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103.
(l)(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of
any county, city, or town.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6

(Laws 1993) (Notifying subscriber or
customer of court order) (electronic
surveillance).

(1) (f) As used in this subsection, "supervisory official" means the investigative
agent in charge or assistant investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an
investigative's headquarters or regional office; a county sheriff or chief deputy
sheriff, or police chief or assistant police chief, the officer in charge of an
investigative task force or the assistant officer in charge; or the attorney general, an
assistant attorney general, a county attorney or district attorney, a deputy county
attorney or deputy district attorney, or the chief prosecuting attorney of any
political subdivision of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3.
A provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly
declared to be retroactive.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an interlocutory appeal from a ruling against the City by the Honorable
A. Toomey, Salt Lake City Department, Utah Third District Court, on the parties'

x
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cross-motions for partial summary judgment. See R. 225-29 (Mem. Decis.); R. 231-34
(Order on Summary Judgment).
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.

Mr. Pearson's Employment and Termination.
1.

The City of South Jordan (the "City") has a population of slightly more that

50,000 and is classified under Utah law as a city of the third class. R. 47; Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-301 (classifications of Utah municipalities based on population).
2.

Mr. Pearson was hired by the City in July 2002 as assistant police chief. R.

3, f 11 (CompL). When the City hired Mr. Pearson for its police department, he was an
at-will employee under Utah statute, which was the 1977 version of Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105. R.43,f 2;R. 161; R. 397 (Hrg. Trans.); R. 219.
3.

Mr. Pearson's position is that "the original version of § 10-3-1105 does not

mandate the at-will status of any employee

the original statute is not relevant to the

issue of statutory interpretation before the Court." See R. 219 (Pearson's Opp. to City's
Motion PSJ).
4.

Mr. Pearson was terminated January 30, 2007. R. 3,111 (CompL). South

Jordan City Manager Rick Horst ("City Manager Horst") gave Mr. Pearson a letter of
termination which states that Mr. Pearson's employment is at-will and he can be
terminated "with or without cause or explanation." R. 166.

xi
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Mr, Pearson's Hearing Before Employee Appeals Board.
5.

On January 31, 2007, Mr. Pearson faxed a letter to the City titled "Notice of

Intent to Appeal Termination." R. 166-67. City Manager Horst informed Mr. Pearson
that his letter had been received and that the due process appeals procedure contained in
the City's Employee Handbook, which was based on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, did
not apply to him because he was an at-will employee. R. 169.
6.

On February 8, 2007, Mr. Pearson sent the City another letter which stated

that it was an appeal of his termination, and also stated that if an appeal of his termination
was refused, the letter was to be considered as notice of his intention to grieve his
termination under the City's grievance procedure. R. 171.
7.

The City's Employee Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") agreed to hear Mr.

Pearson's grievance only as to whether or not he was an at-will employee. R. 83. The
Appeals Board has a dual purpose: (a) to hear appeals of merit3 of employees under Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, and (b) to hear the grievance of any employee, whether at-will or
not.

3

In this appeal, the City will use the terms customarily used by Mr. Pearson.
Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, a "merit employee" refers to an employee of a
municipality who has an established right under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 to the due
process set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. An "at-will employee" refers to an
employee of a municipality who does not have an established right under Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1105 to such process. For general purposes here, whether a municipal employee is
by statute "at-will" or "merit" is determined by § 10-3-1105.
xii
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8.

After hearing testimony and reviewing documents presented, the Appeals

Board's decision was that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. R. 3, If 14 (Compl.).
Mr. Pearson's Appeal to Utah Court of Appeals.
9.

On May 10, 2007, Mr. Pearson filed a Petition in the Utah Court of Appeals

seeking review of the Appeals Board's decision on his grievance. See Petition for
Review (Case No. 20070378CA).
Court of Appeals Transfers Mr. Pearson's Appeal to District Court.
10.

On September 10,2007, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on its own

motion stating it had no jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's appeal, and also stating that it
was transferring the matter to the district court because the appeal "should have been filed
with the district court." See Order (Case No. 20070378CA) (Sept. 10, 2007). The matter
was transferred to the West Jordan Department, Third District Court, where it was
assigned Case No. 070418144.
Mr. Pearson's Appeal in West Jordan Department of Third District Court.
11.

On December 14, 2007, the City filed a "Motion for Summary Disposition

of Appeal" in Case No. 070418144, based on the argument that a district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a grievance and a municipality's appeals
board's decision on whether an employee is an at-will or a merit employee. See Case No.
20080164CA (Exhibit to City's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal). The district court
denied the Motion and declined to decide whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

xiii
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City's First Petition Seeking Interlocutory Review.
12.

The City then filed a Petition for Interlocutory Review on grounds that a

district court cannot decline to rule on its own subject matter jurisdiction. That Petition
was assigned Case No. 20080164CA
Mr. Pearson's First Appeal Reinstated to Utah Court of Appeals.
13.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the City's Petition for Interlocutory

Review (Case No. 20080164CA). The Petition was rendered moot when the Court of
Appeals instead undertook to decide itself the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
14.

After briefing and oral argument, and using formerly-assigned Case No.

20070378CA, the Court of Appeals issued a decision on July 30, 2009. The decision held
that neither the Court of Appeals nor the district court had appellate jurisdiction over a
decision by a municipality's employee appeals board where the decision was not the
result of an appeal conducted under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. See Pearson v. South
Jordan, 2009 UT App 204, 216 P.3d 996.
15.

Pearson v. South Jordan instructed that when an employee and

municipality disagree about whether the employee is an at-will employee or a merit
employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, a declaratory judgment action should be
filed in district court. Pearson, 2009 UT App 204,ffi[16-17, 216 P.3d 996.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Pearson Files a Complaint in District Court.
16.

On or about September 1, 2009, after the Pearson v. South Jordan decision

was issued, Mr. Pearson filed a "Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment"
("Complaint") in Third District Court. SeeR. 1-11. His Complaint sought a declaratory
judgment that, as the City's assistant police chief, his employment was not at-will under
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. R. 1-5. In addition, the Complaint asserted common law
claims for breach of oral and written contracts by the City based on Mr. Pearson's
contention that alleged contracts removed him from at-will status. R. 5-8. The City
answered the Complaint on October 7, 2009. See R. 12-20 (Answer).
Mr. Pearson Files a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
17.

On October 29, 2009, only three weeks after the City answered the

Complaint, Mr. Pearson filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting
Memorandum. R. 30-31 ("Pearson's Motion"); R. 22-29 ("Pearson's Mem.").
18.

Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requested a

"declaration" that Mr. Pearson "was not statutorily ' at-will' at the time of his
termination." R. 30.
19.

Mr. Pearson did not seek summary judgment on his other claims and those

claims are still pending before the district court, and further action has been stayed by the
district court pending the outcome of this appeal. See R. 279-80.
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The City Files a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
20.

On November 12, 2009, the City responded to Mr. Pearson's Motion and

filed its own Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether Mr.
Pearson was an at-will employee under Utah statute. See R. 33-34 ("City's Motion"); R.
36-54 ("City's Combined Mem.").
21.

Included in the City's summary judgment Facts were: (a) Mr. Pearson

admitted that when the City hired him as assistant police chief in July 2002, he was an atwill employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (R. 161) (R. 43-45, ^ 7); (b) the City
always considered Mr. Pearson to be an at-will employee (R. 45-46,fflf11-15); (c) as it
related to the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105, Utah cities typically use "Assistant
Police Chief as the title for the number two person in the organization" and the term
"deputy police chief is "very uncommon in the state of Utah" (R. 46, ^fl[ 16-17).
22.

On December 21, 2009, the City filed a reply in support of its cross-motion

for partial summary judgment. See R. 201 -10.
Oral Argument on the Parties' Cross-Motions For Partial Summary Judgment.
23.

On February 11, 2010, the district court conducted oral argument on the

parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. R. 217 (Minute Entry). At the
hearing, the district court pointed out that the court file did not contain a reply
memorandum by Mr. Pearson, and asked Mr. Pearson to file that reply memorandum after
the hearing. R. 381-82 (Hrg. Trans.).

xvi
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24.

Mr. Pearson's counsel argued first at the hearing. See R. 383. He requested

"a judicial review of the statute at issue, Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1105." R. 383. One
of his arguments was that § 10-3-1105 "is an affirmative statute, meaning that it simply
bestows on certain individuals additional rights, but that it doesn't take away anybody's
rights or mandate the at will status of any employee. Under that interpretation, my
client's position then would be simply unaffected by the statute ..." R. 384-85.
25.

In its oral argument, the City stated that when Mr. Pearson was hired in

2002, "it was the earlier statute [i.e., pre-2004 version] we were looking at and all
members of the police department were at will under Section 10-3-1105." R. 397. The
City also addressed its belief that the version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 which was
in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated, is ambiguous. R. 389-98. In addition, the
City argued that there is a "catch-all" provision in the 2004 version of the statute. R. 39596. The City also asked the district court to review Ward v. Richfield, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), where the Court rejected a plaintiffs argument that § 10-3-1105's (eff.
1977) exclusion of "members of the police department" from coverage as merit
employees did not apply to him because he had a different title, i.e., he was a "city
marshal with appointed assistants," and was not a member of a "police department." R.
394-95.
26.

In response to the City's argument, Mr. Pearson disagreed that there is a

"catch-all" section in the 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. R. 398-99.

xvii
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27.

Mr. Pearson also argued to the district court that the pre-2004 version of

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 was not relevant to the statutory issue, stating:
Also, if we-my-argument is that certainly, that we should be looking at
what the statute was at the time my client was terminated. I think the statute
as it was at the time my client was hired is more relevant to the contract
question .... Again, I think that the more relevant question deals with what
the statute is, but if we want to look back and start asking, okay, what
exactly was it when he was hired, either the city didn't know, didn't
understand the statute or their policy was simply in violation of the law and
it's very difficult for them to go back and try to reconstruct that.
R. 400-01.
28.

After the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement (R.

29.

On February 12, 2010, Mr. Pearson filed a reply memorandum in support of

217).

his Motion. R. 218-23.
District Court's Memorandum Decision,
30.

On April 6, 2010, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision. See R.

225-29. The court found that "[t]his case turns on the construction of Utah Code section
10-3-1105." R.226.
31.

The Memorandum Decision does not address the fact that at the time the

City hired Mr. Pearson, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 mandated that all police and fire
department employees were at-will. See R. 225-29.
32.

Addressing the 2004 version of § 10-3-1105, the Memorandum Decision

examines the dictionary definitions of "assistant" and "deputy" and states that "'deputy' is
xviii
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defined as 'a person appointed as a substitute with power to act/ and 'a second in
command or assistant who usually takes charge when his or her superior is absent.5" R.
227. The Memorandum Decision also states that an "assistant" is "one who assists," and
that "[t]he word 'deputy' thus encompasses someone not only who assists someone else,
but someone who, with greater authority, may conduct the business of another." R. 227.
It then concluded that the statute is not ambiguous. R. 228.
33.

The Memorandum Decision also rejected the City's argument that "a deputy

of a head of a municipal department" can be viewed as a catch-all provision which would
encompass Mr. Pearson's position as assistant police chief, and stated that this would
make the statute redundant. R. 228-29.
34.

On May 14, 2010, the district court signed an Order Granting Plaintiffs

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See R. 213-34. The Order echoed the court's
Memorandum Decision. See id.
The City's Second Petition Seeking Interlocutory Review.
35.

On June 3, 2010, the City filed a Petition requesting interlocutory review of

the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order. See R. 252-53, 255. On August
30, 2010, the Petition was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 275.
36.

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition on September 7, 2010. R. 277.
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B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Mr. Pearson's Hiring and Position as Assistant Police Chief.
1.

The City hired Mr. Pearson in July 2002 as assistant police chief. R. 35 ^ 11

(Compl).
2.

When the City hired Mr. Pearson as assistant police chief, all police and fire

department employees were at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. See R. 161; see
also Ex. 1 in City's Addendum.
3.

Mr. Pearson admits that when the City hired him he knew that all police

department members were at-will employees under the version of Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 effective at that time. R. 89-90.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 was amended effective May 3, 2004 to reflect

its present language. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (history).
5.

The duties and responsibilities of the City's assistant police chief position

are set forth in a job description which shows that Mr. Pearson was second-in-command
in the police department and second-in-command to the City's "Public Safety Director."
SeeR. 179.
6.

The City's job description for assistant police chief, which was effective as

of March 2003 , placed "assistant police chief in the "Department of Public Safety" in the
"Division" of "Police." R. 179. It is an "exempt" classification, and its "General
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Purpose" is stated as "[a]ssumes total responsibility of the department in the absence of
the Public Safety Director." R. 179.
7.

Under "Supervision Received," the City's job description for assistant

police chief states "[w]orks under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety
Director. Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of Chief of Police." R.
179.
8.

The City's organizational charts at the time Mr. Pearson was terminated

show that, as "Assistant Chief of Police," he was second-in-command in the City's police
department. R. 173-75. The organizational chart shows Lindsay Shepherd as "Chief of
Police." R. 173-75.
9.

The letterhead stationary for the South Jordan City Public Safety

Department at the time Mr. Pearson was terminated identifies him as "Chief of Police
Operations" and Lindsay Shepherd as "Director of the Department of Public Safety." R.
177.
10.

Mr. Pearson admitted that during the entire time he was employed by the

City, he reported directly to Lindsay Shepherd, the Chief of Police. R. 95-96.
Mr. Pearson's Termination.
11.

Mr. Pearson was terminated January 30, 2007. The termination letter given

to Mr. Pearson by South Jordan City Manager Rick Horst ("City Manager Horst") states
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Mr. Pearson's position is at-will and that his termination can be "with or without cause or
explanation." R. 166.
12.

City Manager Horst testified that he viewed Mr. Pearson as second-in-

command in the City's police department, and that, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson
generally represented the police department at City meetings when Police Chief Lindsay
Shepard was unavailable. R. 107.
13.

Paul Cunningham was the City's Director of Asset Management at the time

Mr. Pearson was terminated, and he had responsibility for human resources. R. 126-27.
In response to a question by Mr. Pearson well before Mr. Pearson's termination, Mr.
Cunningham had informed Mr. Pearson that, as assistant police chief, he was at-will. R.
127-28.
14.

Mr. Cunningham testified regarding Mr. Pearson's position as assistant

police chief that "It's a semantic difference and that he is the number two person. He is
the assistant of the Police Chief, or the deputy. It's the same thing." R. 127-28. Mr.
Cunningham also stated that Utah citiestypicallyuse "Assistant Police Chief as the title
for the number two person in the organization," (R. 134-35), and that the title "deputy
police chief is "very uncommon in the state of Utah" (R. 135-36).
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Statutory interpretation and Utah case law show that, under Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will.
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First, the statute that applies here is the one in effect when the City hired Mr.
Pearson as assistant police chief in 2002. Under that statute, Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105, all members of municipal police and fire departments in cities of the third,
fourth, and fifth classes were at-will. Mr. Pearson admits this and also admits that when
he was hired, he was an at-will employee by statute. However, the district court
disregarded the 2002 version of § 10-3-1105, apparently swayed by Mr. Pearson's
position in oral argument that the version of § 10-3-1105 in effect when Mr. Pearson was
hired was not particularly relevant to the statutory argument and was more applicable to
his contract claims that now have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
However, this ignored that the law to be applied by the district court is the "statute in
effect at the time of the controversy," and that an employee becomes a statutory at-will
employee at the time of hiring, not at the time of termination. This is reflected in Board
ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court stated
that the employee's employment rights were "created and defined" by the "terms of his
appointment."
Second, since statutory due process rights did not attach at the time of hiring so as
to make Mr. Pearson a merit employee, they could attach only if there was a later statute
which retroactively made Mr. Pearson a merit employee. However, the 2004 amendments
to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 on which Mr. Pearson relies do not specify that they
should be applied retroactively. Under Utah law, a statute or statutory amendment may
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not be applied retroactively unless it states it is retroactive. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3.
Third, a statutory amendment also cannot be applied retroactively if it
"substantively modifies" the prior version of the statute. Mr. Pearson's arguments
focused only on Mr. Pearson's substantive rights, and ignored that the City also has
substantive rights which allowed it under pre-amendment Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 to
terminate any police department member without cause. An amendment can be applied
retroactively only when: "(1) the legislative change merely 'clarifies] the meaning of the
earlier enactment,' or (2) the amendment changed the law in a procedural way that does
not effect the substantive rights of the parties." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, Tj 41, 234
P.3d 1105 (citations omitted). These do not apply here.
Fourth, the district court's failure to assess whether the pre- or post-2004 version
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 should apply, was plain error. In this case, the error was
or should have been obvious to the district court, since both versions of the statute were
submitted to the district court and were discussed in oral argument, yet the district court
addressed only the May 3, 2004 version. The City was prejudiced by the district court's
failure to address the earlier version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105.
Fifth, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson was also an at-will employee under the
amended version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 in effect at the time the City terminated
him. There is no merit to his argument that the plain language of § 10-3-1105 should
apply so that he was not an at-will employee because his title was "assistant police chief

xxiv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and not "deputy police chief." This Court should look beyond the plain language of
amended § 10-3-1105 because: (1) the term "a deputy police chief is ambiguous in the
context of § 10-3-1105 and as shown by reference to several statutes in the same and
related chapters, and (2) construing "a deputy police chief solely as a title and not as a
hierarchal position/category "works an absurd result."
Sixth, because § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, it can be interpreted through extrinsic
evidence, and it should be found here that "a deputy" is best interpreted as the second-incommand. This means that Mr. Pearson was at-will under § 10-3-1105(2)(d) because his
position equated to and was the same as "a deputy police chief as defined. Significantly,
the district court's definitional analysis of § 10-3-1105 actually supports that Mr. Pearson
was an at-will employee based on his job responsibilities. This is consistent with the
City's position at oral argument that the legislature's use of the indefinite article "a" to
reference "a deputy" instead of the definite article "the," is indicative of the intent of the
legislature to view "a deputy" as a hierarchal category/position, and not just a plainlanguage title. Policy considerations also support viewing "a deputy" as a hierarchal
position/category of a second-in-command. This would be consistent with the
legislature's apparent intent that there should be no requirement of just cause when
terminating municipal employees who are not directly involved in a meaningful and
significant way with policy, oversight, and responsibility for managing a municipal
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department. The undisputed facts of Mr. Pearson's responsibilities as assistant police
chief show that he was second-in command.
Seventh, as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson also could be terminated without
cause because he was "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" under §
10-3-1105(2)(h). Since no department is identified in § 10-3-1105(2)(g) or (h), these
provisions can be viewed as "a catch-all" in which exact titles (i.e., plain language) are
not relevant. Such catch-all provisions allow municipalities to retain their existing job
titles, and they are consistent with the reasoning in Ward v. Richfield City. In this
context, it is also significant here that Mr. Pearson was not just assistant police chief, he
also was "Chief of Police Operations" in the South Jordan Department of Public Safety.
VL ARGUMENT
A.

MR. PEARSON WAS AT-WILL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1105.
Statutory interpretation and Utah case law show that, under Utah Code Ann. §

10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will when the City hired him, and he continued to be atwill until he was terminated.
1,

Mr. Pearson Was Hired as a Statutory At-will Employee, and
Continued as an At-will Employee Throughout His Employment.

Mr. Pearson was a statutory at-will employee when the City hired him as assistant
police chief, and his at-will status was not changed by the enactment of a later version of
the same statute.
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The City pointed out to the district court that when the City hired Mr. Pearson as
assistant police chief in July 2002, he was at-will because all members of municipal
police and fire departments were at-will under the version of Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 that was in effect in July 2002. R. 397. That version of § 10-3-1105 states:
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than
members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments,
and superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of
time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (emphasis added) (R. 161).
Under this statute, all municipal employees other than those specifically excluded
were to be treated by municipalities as merit employees who had an established right to
due process protections. All members of municipal police and fire departments were
excluded by the statute, and had no right to due process. Even Mr. Pearson admitted that
he knew he was an at-will employee under statutory law at the time the City hired him.
Facts Tf 3. However, when this issue was raised by the City at the hearing on the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment {see R 395-96), Mr. Pearson's response was that the
2002 version of § 10-3-1105 in effect when Mr. Pearson was hired was not particularly
relevant, i.e., his counsel argued that:
we should be looking at what the statute was at the time my client was
terminated. I think the statute as it was at the time my client was hired is
more relevant to the contract question .... if we want to look back and start
asking, okay, what exactly was [the statute] when he was hired, either the
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city didn't know, didn't understand the statute or their policy was simply in
violation of the law and it's very difficult for them to try to go back and
reconstruct that.
R. 400-01.
Similarly, Mr. Pearson's position at oral argument on § 10-3-1105fs history was
that it "is an affirmative statute, meaning that it simply bestows on certain individuals
additional rights, but that it doesn't take away anybody's rights or mandate the at will
status of any employee. Under that interpretation, my client's position then would be
simply unaffected by the statute ..." R. 384-85.
The district court apparently accepted this argument by Mr. Pearson, because the
version of § 10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was hired was not addressed
in the district court's summary judgment decision. However, the statute in effect when
Mr. Pearson was hired should have been addressed by the district court prior to and in
conjunction with any assessment or application of the version of Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated.
The district court's duty on summary judgment is to assess the governing law, and
the parties do not dispute that some version of § 10-3-1105 is the governing statutory law.
See Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, \ 14, 234 P.3d 1105. Generally, the law to be applied
by the district court is the "statute in effect at the time of the controversy." Id. at \ 41
(citations omitted). The essence of Mr. Pearson's statutory complaint is that he had due
process rights at the time of his termination under § 10-3-1106, because the 2004 version
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of § 10-3-1105 made him a merit employee and did not take anything away from rights he
already had. SeeR. 384-85.
This analysis is flawed. Whether there is a statutory due process right is
established at the time of hiring, not termination. This is shown in Board ofRegents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where in discussing whether a university employee had a right
to due process, the United States Supreme Court stated that the employee's employment
rights were "created and defined" by the "terms of his appointment." See Roth, 408 U.S.
at 577-78. See also, e.g., Randall v. Buena Vista County Hosp., 75 F. Supp.2d 946, 95556 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (due process requires "legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment"); Trivoli v. Multnomah County Rural Fire Dep % 703 P.2d 285, 287 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985) (properly interest in employment is substantive; employee must have
reasonable expectation of tenure "at the time he was hired").
Further, whether there is a statutory right to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106fs due
process procedures is determined by whether the public employee is a merit employee or
at-will under § 10-3-1105. Accordingly, the relevant controversy as to the issue on appeal
is not that the City terminated Mr. Pearson; the controversy instead is whether a statutory
right to due process pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 attached at the time the City
hired Mr. Pearson. If statutory rights to due process under § 10-3-1106 did attach at the
time Mr. Pearson was hired, he would be entitled to due process procedures before he
could be terminated. If such statutory rights did not attach at that time, statutory due
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process rights under § 10-3-1106 could attach only if there was a later substantive statute
which gave Mr. Pearson such rights retroactively.
The statutory terms of Mr. Pearson's employment in the City's police department
were set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 as it existed at the time he was hired.
Under that version of § 10-3-1105, Mr. Pearson was at-will and had no statutory due
process rights. By failing to address or consider the version of § 10-3-1105 under which
the City hired Mr. Pearson, the court effectively applied retroactively and without
question the version of § 10-3-1105 that was in effect when Mr. Pearson was terminated.
This would have been understandable if the legislature had indicated that the 2004
statutory amendments to § 10-3-1105 could bt applied retroactively, but the legislature
did not so state. Utah law of many decades makes clear that a statute or statutory
amendment may not be applied retroactively unless it specifically states that it is
retroactive. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("A provision of the Utah Code is not
retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive."). There is
nothing in § 10-3-1105 that "expressly declares" that the 2004 amendments are to apply
retroactively.
It also is well-settled that, absent a legislative statement of retroactive application,
a statutory amendment should never be applied retroactively if it "substantively modifies"
the prior version of the statute. See, e.g., Harvey v. Cedar Hills, 2010 UT 12,fflf2, 16-17,
227 P.3d 256. "Substantively modifies" is related to whether the "substantive law" is
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modified by the amendment. See id. at ^ 25. The "substantive law" is defined as "the
'positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and
which may give rise to a cause of action.'" Id. This is shown in Harney v. Cedar Hills,
where the Court determined that a later statute had substantively modified the earlier
statute because "the two versions of the statute" were "substantively different with regard
to the relative standards for disconnection." Id. at \ 31.
The definition of "substantially modifies" shows the flaw in Mr. Pearson's
statement to the district court in oral argument that § 10-3-1105 "is an affirmative statute,
meaning that it simply bestows on certain individuals additional rights, but that it doesn't
take away anybody's rights or mandate the at will status of any employee. Under that
interpretation, my client's position then would be simply unaffected by the statute.. .."
See R. 384-85. Viewed in the context of well-settled law, this statement by Mr. Pearson
improperly focuses only on Mr. Pearson's rights. It ignores that the City had substantive
rights that were defined by the pre-2004 version of § 10-3-1105, because at the time the
City hired Mr. Pearson as "a member" of its police department, it had no statutory
obligation, duty, or responsibility to treat Mr. Pearson as a merit employee.
The foregoing also shows the flaw in Mr. Pearson's response to the City's oral
argument, i.e., the City argued that when Mr. Pearson was hired in 2002, "it was the
earlier statute we were looking at and all members of the police department were at will
under Section 10-3-1105." R. 397. Addressing this statement, Mr. Pearson argued to the
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district court that pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is not particularly relevant to the
termination issue and instead is more relevant to his (still-pending) claims that he is not
an at-will employee due to alleged oral and/or verbal contract(s) with the City. See R.
400-01.
Utah law also makes clear that an amendment can be applied retroactively only
when: "(1) the legislative change merely 'clarifies] the meaning of the earlier
enactment/ or (2) the amendment changed the law in a procedural way that does not
effect the substantive rights of the parties." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, \ 41, 234 P.3d
1105 (citations omitted). The 2004 amendments to § 10-3-1105 clearly are not
"procedural," nor do they "clarify the meaning of the earlier enactment." Instead, those
amendments were substantive and affected the substantive rights of certain
municipalities, because they dictated that those municipalities no longer could treat all
police department "members" as at-will, with the exception of the employee categories
indicated.
In short, prior to May 3,2004, the City clearly had the right to treat Mr. Pearson as
an at-will employee under the version of the statute in effect when he was hired, since the
"rights" established in pre-2004 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 included a municipality's
right not to treat police department employees as merit employees, as well as a
municipality's substantive right to terminate such employees without "cause." That same
right of the City to treat Mr. Pearson as an at-will employee continued despite the 2004
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amendments, because there is no retroactivity provision in the 2004 amendments and the
amendments are substantive.
Even if the issue of Mr. Pearson's being hired under a version of § 10-3-1105 that
made him an at-will employee had not been raised with the district court, which it was,
under the plain error rule the issue should be addressed here. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of
the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd, 2009 UT 76,ffif25-29, 226 P.3d 719 (discussing plain
error); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989) (same). "Plain error" means
that the error must be plain to the district court, and the error must affect the substantial
rights of the party arguing it. See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. Furthermore, "[a]s a matter
of law, a trial court does not have the discretion to exceed the limits of the law. Doing so,
by definition, is error." State v. Beck, 2007 UT 60, % 10, 165 P.3d 1225. "To show the
obviousness of the error, the [party claiming it] must show that the law governing the
error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." Id. at f 11.
In this matter, the error was or should have been obvious to the district court, since
both versions of the statute were submitted to the district court and discussed there, yet
the court addressed only the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105. Further, one of the
basic tenets of Utah law is that a statute cannot be applied retroactively except under
certain conditions. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. The district court knew that when Mr.
Pearson was hired he was an at-will employee under statute, and knew that the statute that
made him at-will was amended in 2004 and that this later statute wras the one on which
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Mr. Pearson relied for his alleged due process rights as a merit employee under
§ 10-3-1106. See Nature of Case,ffij2, 21, 24-25, 27, 30; Factsffif2-4, sz^ra. Despite
this, the district court apparently adopted Mr. Pearson's argument that the pre-2004
version of § 10-3-1105 was not particularly important except to Mr. Pearson's contract
claims. This is error under Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, and it should have been obvious to
the district court that there was no retroactivity statement in the May 3, 2004 version of §
10-3-1105 and that the 2004 amendments were substantive.
Moreover, the district court's not addressing this issue was harmful to the City
because there is at least a reasonable chance that the outcome on the cross-motions for
summary judgment would have been different if the court had assessed both versions of §
10-3-1105. See Sierra Club, 2009 UT 76,128, 226 P.3d 719 (discussing plain error).
In sum, the district court erred in not addressing both the pre-2004 and the post2004 versions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 in the context of Mr. Pearson's
employment. Since this is strictly a question of law, and the facts are not in dispute, the
City requests that this Court address and correct the district court's obvious and plain
error.
2.

Mr. Pearson Was an At-Will Employee under the Amendments to Utah
Code Ann. §10-3-1105.

Mr. Pearson also is an at-will employee under the version of Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 in effect at the time the City terminated him.
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As argued above, § 10-3-1105 generally governs which municipal employees are
at-will under Utah statute and which are merit employees. An assessment of the May 3,
2004 version of § 10-3-1105 shows that Mr. Pearson also was at-will under that version.
That version of the statute states:
(1)
Except as provided in Subsection (2)5 each employee of a
municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in
Section 10-3-1106:
(2)

Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a)
an officer appointed by the mayor or other person exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(I)
(j)
(k)

a member of the municipality's police department or fire
department in a first or second class city;4
a police chief of the municipality;
a deputy police chief of the municipality;
a fire chief of the municipality;
a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
a head of a municipal department;
a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
a superintendent;
a probationary employee of the municipality; or
a seasonal employee of the municipality.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2). Mr. Pearson contends that when he was terminated, the
amended version of § 10-3-1105 applied, and he was not an at-will employee under the

4

Police and fire department employees in Utah cities of the first and second class
that have a civil sendee commission are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001
through-1013.
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amended version because his title was "assistant police chief and not "deputy police
chief." This argument should be rejected.
a.

Interpreting the May 3,2004 Version of Section 10-3-1105.

This Court should look beyond the plain language of amended § 10-3-1105 in
construing the statute because the statute is ambiguous. When construing a statute, courts
do not "look beyond the plain language of [the] provision" unless the court "fmd[s] some
ambiguity in it." Utah Pub. Employees Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, f 59,131 P.3d 208
(citations omitted). The essence of "ambiguity" is a provision's having "two or more
plausible meanings." See id. at ^f 60. To determine whether "two or more plausible
meanings" exist, a court considers the plain language of a provision and also reads the
"text of the statute as a whole" and "interprets] its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters," i.e.:
. . . determining whether there are two or more plausible meanings depends
not only on the text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text
of the statute as a whole. Indeed, "[w]e 'read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.'" As a result, a statute
susceptible to competing interpretations may nevertheless be unambiguous
if the text of the act as a whole, in light of related statutory provisions,
makes all but one of those meanings implausible. When viewing the act as
a whole does not eliminate duplicative yet plausible meanings, the statute is
ambiguous, and we may resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve the
ambiguity.
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Id. (internal citations omitted). When construing statutes, the court should attempt to give
effect to the legislature's intent, and a court should not "follow the literal language of a
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result":
Above all, this court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give
effect to the legislature's intent. To discern legislative intent, "we look first
to the statute's plain language." "We read the plain language of the statute
as a whole [] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in
the same chapter and related chapters." When the plain meaning of the
statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are
needed. However, "a court should not follow the literal language of a
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result."
LPIServ. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41,1f 11, 215 P.3d 135 (citations omitted).
When a provision contains ambiguity or uncertainty, the court should select the
interpretation that "best harmonizes" with the "general purpose" of the statute:
where there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of a statute .. . and
if it is easily susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be
chosen which best harmonizes with its [the statute's] general purpose.
Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct App. 1994).
Application of these standards here shows that: (1) the term "a deputy police
chief is ambiguous in the context of § 10-3-1105 and as shown by reference to statutes in
the same and related chapters, (2) construing "a deputy police chief solely as a title and
not as a hierarchal position/category "works an absurd result," and (3) a police
department's second-in-command is at-will under § 10-3-1105 no matter what title a
municipality gives to that position.
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b.

The Term "A Deputy" in Section 10-3-1105 Is Ambiguous.

The City's position is that considering the "plain language of the statute as a
whole," and "interpreting] its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters," shows that the word "deputy" is ambiguous and is
susceptible of more than one meaning. It can be the literal title "deputy," or it can be a
hierarchal position/category, regardless of title, of an employee who is closely aligned
with the "head of a municipal department" and has authority to assume or exercise the
position of the head, i.e., a second-in-command. This rationale is consistent with the
question of why, under the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105(2), would certain
positions (or titles) be excluded from merit status and made at-will. The only logical
reason for this is to exclude those positions that amount to a second-in-command, since a
second-in-command is closely aligned with the department head's policy-making
responsibility and decisions. For example, "a deputy of a head of a municipal
department," which is one exclusion in § 10-3-1105, could only mean a catch-all
hierarchal category/position of a second-in-command in any municipal department,
inasmuch as the "municipal department" is unidentified. See Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105(h) (excluding from merit status "a deputy of a head of a municipal
department").
By contrast, Mr. Pearson's position is that the "title" given in the May 3, 2004
version of § 10-3-1105 trumps any other analysis, and that plain language must prevail.
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This is illogical. Accepting Mr. Pearson's "title" analysis would mean that a "marshal" in
a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class would be a merit employee under the May 3, 2004
version of § 10-3-1105 simply because the title "marshal" is not excluded by
§ 10-3-1105fs plain language. By the same "title" analysis, "a police chief would be atwill even though a "marshal" of a police department is the same thing as a "police chief."
See Utah Code Ann., § 10-3-918 & -919 (equating "police chief with "marshal" in cities
of second, third, fourth classes). This type of analysis was rejected in Ward v. Richfield
City, 116 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which examined the pre-2004 version of § 10-31105, which had excluded from merit status all "members of police departments]." In
Ward, this Court rejected the position of the "City Marshall" of Richfield City, who had
argued that he was a merit employee and not at-will under § 10-3-1105 because his title
was "city marshal with appointed assistants." This court found no merit in this argument,
noting that sections of Title 10 use the terms "chief of police" and "city marshal"
interchangeably. Id. at 97 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918).
Similarly, accepting Mr. Pearson's analysis would mean that any chief law
enforcement officer would be a merit employee in a city of the third, fourth, and fifth
class (as well as in a city of the first and second class that chose not to have a civil service
commission) if that person did not have the specific title of "police chief,"5 even though

5

It is significant to the interpretation of the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105
that the Utah Code does not address or dictate how municipalities "title" their main law
enforcement agency, or its hierarchy or positions.
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that person might be appointed and be a policy-maker. Interpreting the statute to permit
this distinction would "work an absurd result."
Furthermore, construing "deputy" in § 10-3-1105 as a plain language title and not
as a hierarchal category/position creates ambiguities and absurd results when compared
with other statutes in the same or related chapters. For example, a statute in the same
chapter states that "[t]he chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth
class or town . . . may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or
marshal, appoint assistants to the chief of police or marshal." See Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-918. Thus, the chief of police in such cities is not authorized to appoint "a deputy"
and may only appoint an "assistant," even though the "assistant" clearly would be a
designated second-in-command. Conversely, there presumably would be no prohibition
on a chief of police in a city of the first or second class that did not have a civil service
commission (and accordingly also was governed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105), with
regard to appointing "deputies."
Another statute gives certain powers, duties, and responsibilities to a "chief of
police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class." See §
10-3-919 (referencing "powers, duties, and responsibilities" set forth in §§ 10-3-913
through -915). Interestingly, no "powers, duties, and responsibilities" are given to a
"deputy police chief by § 10-3-919. See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-913 through 915. In fact, the only "police department" members referenced in these statutes are police
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chiefs, assistant police chiefs, and "police officers." See id. The word "deputy" is not
used for a specific police department employee; the only time that "deputy" is used is for
a deputy sheriff. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1).
Additional ambiguities and absurd results are created when Utah Code Ann. §
53-13-103 is viewed in context with the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105. Section 5313-103 states that a "'[l]aw enforcement officer' specifically includes the following:...
(i) any sheriff, deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of any county,
city, or town." See Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103. Thus, under § 53-13-103, "assistant
police chief is not listed as a titled "law enforcement officer" under Utah law, despite the
fact that a police chief can appoint only "assistants" under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918.
Ambiguity and absurd results also arise when comparing § 10-3-1105 with the
Utah Criminal Code at Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6, which deals with electronic
communications and surveillance and is captioned as "[njotifying subscriber or customer
of court order." Section 77-23b-6 does not list "deputy police chief as a supervisory
position, but does list "assistant police chief as a supervisory position. As used in that
section, "supervisory official" is "the investigative agent in charge or assistant
investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an investigative agency's headquarters
or regional office; a county sheriff or chief deputy sheriff or police chief or assistant
police chief...."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6 (l)(f) (emphasis added). Thus, under this

statute "chief deputy sheriff appears as the equivalent of "assistant police chief."
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Perhaps the most absurd result and ambiguity is that "a deputy police chief and
an "assistant police chief are at-will in first and second class cities with a civil service
commission, whereas under the district court's reasoning in this case, only the title "a
deputy police chief would be at-will in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth classes, as
well as in cities of the first and second class that chose not to have a civil service
commission. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(1) with id § 10-3-1105 (eff. May 3,
2004). To add to this absurd result, only the title "deputy fire chief is at-will in cities of
the first and second class with a civil service commission, but under the district court's
reasoning in this case, both titles "a deputy fire chief and "assistant fire chief are at-will
in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth class, as well as in cities of the first and second class
without a civil service commission. See id.
In light of the foregoing, the district court erred in finding that there is no
ambiguity with regard to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105.
c.

"Deputy" in Section 10-3-1105 Should Be Interpreted as Secondin-Command.

Because the term "deputy" in § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, it can be interpreted
through extrinsic evidence. It should be found here that "a deputy" should be interpreted
as the second-in-command, and that Mr. Pearson was at-will under § 10-3-1105(2)(d)
because his position equated to and was the same as "a deputy police chief as defined.
Section 10-3-1105 reflects that "deputy police chief can reasonably be understood
as second-in-command, since it also includes "a deputy of a head of a municipal
17
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department" as a non-protected "at-will" employee, i.e., the second-in-command in a
municipal department is included. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(h). As discussed
previously, this analysis of terms based on job responsibilities is reflected in Ward v.
Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). At issue in Ward was the pre-2004
version of § 10-3-1105, which excluded from merit status all "members of police
department^]." An employee of defendant Richfield City contended that he was a merit
employee and not at-will because his title was "city marshal with appointed assistants."
This Court rejected this argument, and held that the employee could not evade
§ 10-3-1105's exclusion of "members of police department," since other sections of Title
10 use the terms "chief of police" and "city marshal" interchangeably. Id. at 97 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918). Ward's analysis also can be used here, since other parts of
Title 10 use assistant police chief for what clearly is the second-in-command in a police
department. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-918 & -919.
Moreover, despite the district court's ultimate conclusion, its definitional analysis
of § 10-3-1105 actually supports that Mr. Pearson is an at-will employee. Indeed, while
rejecting the idea of ambiguity, the district court actually illustrated it in its Memorandum
Decision, which states:
The word "deputy" is defined as "a person appointed as a substitute
with power to act," and a "second in command or assistant who usually
takes charge when his or her superior is absent." Mirriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). The word "assistant" is a person who
assists, a helper. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deputy" as "[a]
substitute; a person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of
18
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the functions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the latter."
As these terms are commonly understood, an assistant is "one who assists,"
whereas a deputy is "A person named or empowered to act for another."
The word "deputy" thus encompasses someone not only who assists
someone else, but someone who, with greater authority, may conduct the
business of another. From an organizational standpoint, other portions of
the Code suggest that the distinction has hierarchical implications, [citing
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(3).]. Accordingly, while there are some
similarities in the meanings of these terms, they are not interchangeable and
are separate and distinct, and the court does not in the context of this statute
find that the word "deputy" is ambiguous.
R. 227-28. See also R. 391 (City defines "deputy" at oral argument as a "substitute, a
person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of the functions pertaining to
the office in the place and stead of the latter"). In failing to see the ambiguity in the
statute, the district court did not address that "a deputy" can be viewed as a
category/position, and not simply the specific title. If Mr. Pearson's position with the
City had been viewed as a category/position and not simply a title, he would have been "a
deputy" under the statute because his job description is consistent with the definition of
"deputy" cited by the district court. By contrast, Mr. Pearson's job description shows that
he was not simply an "assistant" as defined by the district court.
Indeed, the definition of "deputy" cited by the district court is a definition of a
second-in-command. In this context, the City had pointed out to the district court that the
legislature's use of the indefinite article "a" to reference "a deputy" instead of the definite
article "the," is indicative of the intent of the legislature to view "a deputy" as a hierarchal
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category/position, and not just a plain-language title. The City pointed out at oral
argument that:
the statute doesn't say "the deputy police chief," it says "a deputy of [sic]
police chief." . . . it's the indefinite article that's used "a" rather than "the." .
.. suggesting that it's a category, "a" deputy, not "the" deputy, but "a"
deputy. Now, if you look at—again, at the text of the statute as a whole, not
just the plain language of that line, you see that the legislature has identified
a whole category of people who are at will and these are the deputies of
heads of a municipal department. Again, indicating, when you look at the
statute as a whole, it — the legislature intended for a category-type, or
position-type approach.
R. 392-93. As discussed above, this is borne out in Utah's Criminal Code, which uses the
term "assistant police chief for what certainly is a "deputy" as defined by the district
court. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6(l)(f) (electronic surveillance). It also is reflected
in the Utah statute that allows a police chief in cities of the third, fourth, and fifth classes
to appoint "assistants." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918.
Policy considerations also dictate that "a deputy police chief in Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1105 should be construed as the category/position of second-in-command. For
example, in the same statute, "a deputy" clearly is used to mean second-in-command in an
unidentified "department." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(h). Furthermore, the
positions/categories made at-will by § 10-3-1105 suggest that the legislature intends to
limit § 10-3-1106 due process entitlement to employees who are not in policy making or
policy implementing positions and who are not directly involved in a meaningful and
significant way with running a municipal department.
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Based on these standards, Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. Mr. Pearson, City
Manager Horst5 and others testified that Mr. Pearson was second-in-command in the
City's police department, and organizational charts show the position was second-inc mi\ ma nd Set ? Facts ^ 5-10 1 2 1 I

Fhe Cit:> h a ci no ,;depi it) ' 'police c liief \ See id

This means that the hierarchal category/position "a der

• ponce ch lef in § i 11-1- II105

would be the same as assistant police chief in the City's specific law enforcement
departmental structure.
r;

; ^

I

: .;,

. A- .;.. . - w . .„•

command and in a policy making/polic\ --r-- .r *-:

;.;.

s secona-m-

.-i •* -

in the development of departmental programs," and "[a]ssumes departmental
responsibility in the absence of the Chief of Police." See Facts ^f 7 The position also
"pro\ ides genei al supei v ision to all department personnel, directly and through
subordinate supervisors," and: (I) "oversees [the] qualily of overall departmental
performance management functions"; (2) "assists in the development and implementation
of quality control guidelines"; (3) "makes recommendations for changes in policies and
pn i-eeJuies. and implements changes upon approval"; (4) "represents] the Police
Department as public meetings as necessary"; Jiul i M "sels (sic) on (Ihe] regional counu
training board." See Factsfflf6-7.
In sum, the May 3, 2004 version of § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous because it can have
tv

:»mailings- the exact title, or a hierarchal position/category of persons who fit "a
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deputy" definition. Interpreting "a deputy" as a hierarchal position/category of those who
are second-in-command in a law enforcement agency would effect the intent of the
legislature regarding policy-making/implementing positions.
3.

Mr. Pearson Was At-Will Because He Was a "Deputy of a Head of a
Municipal Department."

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Pearson also is excluded from due process coverage
under the 2004 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 because as assistant police
chief, he was "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" under § 10-3-1105(2)(h).
Under the 2004 amendments, "a head of a municipal department" is also at-will. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(g). Since no department is identified in
§ 10-3-1105(2)(g) or (h), these can be viewed as catch-all provisions in which exact titles
(i.e., plain language) are not relevant. This kind of analysis permits ambiguities or
inconsistencies in § 10-3-1105 that might be created by a municipality's using a different
"title," to comply with and effect the legislature's intent. For example, to apply this to a
municipal police department headed by a "marshal" would mean that the marshal was not
a merit employee even though the exact title "marshal" is not used in § 10-3-1105 for the
head of a police department.
Mr. Pearson's position in the district court was that "a deputy of a head of a
municipal department" is not a "catch-all" provision, and refers only to the fact that a
municipality may create a new department not previously considered. See R. 398. The
district court's position regarding a "catch-all" provision was that to apply "deputy of a
22
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head of a municipal department" to Mr. Pearson's position w o u l d "read a redi indancy into
the statute." See R. 228. These arguments are undermined by Ward's marshal/police
chief issue, by the fact that Utah statute allows a police chief to appoint only assistants, as
vv t II as 1: y othe r statiit.es, For example, undei § 10 3 918. a ''marshal" Is an acceptable
term and a person in that position clearh v;m be t h r he;nl of a pnlire dcpartirici ml m ILiw
enforcement agency. Mr. Pearson's proposed plain language analysis would mean that
the marshal is a merit employee under § 10-3-1105. However, if "marshal" is viewed
under § 1 0-3-11 05(g) as " 'a head of a. municipal department," a marshal, like a police
ch ief, Is at-will
Section 10-3-1105(h) should be viewed as a catch-all that will capture second-incommand "positions" regardless of the title for a position that a municipality uses. F o r
example, as head uf the police department, the City's police chief is "head o f a municipal
department." As lh a^sist:inl. M Mr Pears* MI \\;is k\\ iJepuh «»l .i bead H * J nuiinu|Ml
department" because he was second-in-command. Thus, the exact titles are - ,* -vl \ -;
Moreover, in the instant case, the City's police chief had another title. I he City
had placed the police and fire departments under the Department of Public Safety. See
FHII

" ^ l 4-7 1 inilsa) Shepherd vuts identified in I he I Vparlment n( Puhlk Saiet) "s •

letterhead stationary as "Director," and Mr. Pearson was identified as "Chief of Police
Operations." Facts f 9. A s Director of Public Safety, Lindsay Shepherd was also a "head
o f a municipal department," and Mr. Pearson was at-will because as assistant police chief
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and Chief of Police Operations, Mr. Pearson was a "deputy of a head of a municipal
department."
In sum, the 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, including
when viewed in context with other Utah statutes dealing with law enforcement. To
reconcile these ambiguities, the Court should find that "a deputy" is a hierarchal
position/category meaning a second-in-command, and that as assistant police chief, Mr.
Pearson was an at-will employee.
CONCLUSION
South Jordan City respectfully asks this Court to find that the district court erred in
finding that Mr. Pearson was a merit employee under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Given the unusual posture of this case and the unusual legal issues raised, as well
as the fact that the case is significant to numerous municipalities in Utah because of their
own law enforcement agency "titles," South Jordan City requests oral argument to assist
the Court in more fully understanding its position.
DATED this jf%_ day of February, 2011.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
— >
f

'

!

By:_^
lie IN. Jonnson
'-Wclith D. Wolferts
Attorneys for South Jordan City
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ADDENDUM
1.

Statutes and Rules of Central Importance
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2002 Version)
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2004 Version)
Utah 2004 Session Laws, Senate Bill 23, Amends Utah Code Ann.
§10-3-1105
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3 -919
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6
Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3

2.

Transcript of Hearing on Partial Summary Judgment Motion

3.

Memorandum Decision
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
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MUNIr [p^i, r;r ^VE^N M E N T

that would have accrued during the period beginning with the establishment
of the system and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and
employees been included within the system from its establishment.
History: C. 1953, 10-3-1104, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3
NOTES TO DECISIONS
necessary resolutions permitting employees to
participate; and (2) provide funds necessary for
cost of participation. Taft v. Glade, 114 Utah
435, 201 P.2d 285 (1948),

Prerequisites.
Before library employees were eligible to participate in city plan under prior law, the library
board had to take proper action consisting of at
least two separate and distinct acts: (1) Pass

&0O3* Version

10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees — Duration
and termination of term of office.
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members
of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
no successor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson ,
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).
Removal.

ANALYSIS

Construction.
De facto officer.
Duration of term.
Removal;
—Council to concur.
—Right to appeal.
—Who holds power.
—Without cause.

—Council to concur.
The consent of a majority of the council is
necessary for removal of officer. State ex rel.
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334
(1903).
Assuming that the city marshal was rightfully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to
remove him without the concurrence of the
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v.
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918).

Construction.
The language "as hereinafter provided" in
this section specifically refers to the sections
that follow. Therefore, "any officer" in § 10-31106 must mean any officer not excluded in this
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776. P.2d 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah
1990).
De facto officer.
Where the person in possession of a city office
is at most only a de facto officer, he is subject to
removal at any time and is not in a position to
complain of the city council's action abolishing
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812
(1897).
Duration of term.
City marshal's term will not in any event last
beyond the next municipal election even though

—Right to appeal.
The legislature intended specifically to exclude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a
police "department," from the appeal provisions
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
757 (Utah 1990).
—Who holds power.
When this section is read in connection with
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it
will be seen that the same authorities who have
the power of appointment, the mayor and city
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v.
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437,154 P.2d 653 (1944).
—Without cause.
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal
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10-3-1106

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

in cities of the third class may be removed
without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah
437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Etc. § 255.
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 496 to 501, 552, 719.
A.L.R. — Pre-employment conduct as ground

for discharge of civil sen'ice employee having
permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488.
Determination as to good faith in abolition of
public service or employment subject to civil
service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 1165.

10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals — Board —
Procedure,
(1) No officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 shall be discharged
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective
officers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and
two of wThom shall be members of the governing body.
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the
appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence
and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the
discharge or transfer.
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony,
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal,
board.
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the
officer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing,
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further
proceedings shall be had.
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it.'
The board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his
salary for the period of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency,
in salary for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration1"
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body
of the municipality.
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The
employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day
414
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t I.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1105
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
* 1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government
11 Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits
# § 1 0 - 3 - 1 1 0 5 . Municipal employees—Duration and termination of e m p l o y m e n t Exceptions

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment
without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
12 ) S u b s e ct" on ( 1 ) »' < , «-• " s r > o i" ^ p pI y i" <)'.
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the
municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the
classified civil service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
i •

r

a ;epv*

;• assistant r re :r.'--- if the municipality;

(g) a head of a mi micipal department;
(I i) a clepi it:1"1] oil ' a I \ee ::l of a i i n m Hcipal depai ti i neii it;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a p a i 1: "I: i i i i e e i i i p I o > e e o f t I i e i m i
(!) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a niunicipality's ability to
define cause for an employee termination or reduction in force.
CREDIT(S)
L a\ s 1 9: ' 1

1 8, § 3; Laws 2004 f c. 260, Q ±, erf. May 3, 2004.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Utah's justice court system, a legal charade. Mike Martinez, 22 Utah B.J, 27 (March/April, 2009).

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Municipal Corporations <ft»149(l), 217.6.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 2 6 8 k l 4 9 ( l ) ; 268k217.6.
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 55 361, 6 0 1 , 604, 608 to 6 1 1 , 615, 6 1 1 to 619.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
125 A,L.R. 263, Constitutionality and Construction, as to Nature of Review, of Statute Providing for
Appeal to or Review by Court, as Regards Order of Civil Service Commission.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Abolishment of office 2
City marshals 8
De facto officers 5
Department heads 4
Due process 1
Evidence 9
Incumbents 3
Reappointment 7
Removal of employees 6
Termination 10
1. Due process
Plaintiff, having been fired from his job as director of parks for city in Utah, had no property interest
in his job warranting due process protection under Utah law but did have liberty interest, and due
process remedy was an opportunity to refute the charge, his right being one which arose because
there was danger of foreclosure of the community, due to derogatory reasons for being fired. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 1. 5, 14; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6), 59, 59(e), 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.C.A. 5
1983; U.C.A.1953, 1 0 - 3 - 1 1 0 5 . Eames v. City of Logan, Utah, 1985, 762 F.2d 83. Constitutional Law
%^ 4 1 7 1 ; Constitutional Law <^ 4173(3)
Police department employee had a recognized property right in his job, and thus, city was required to
follow adequate due process procedures in connection with termination of his employment. Becker v.
Sunset City, 2009, 216 P.3d 367, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 r 2009 UT App 197. Constitutional Law <^
4172(6); Municipal Corporations o» 185(3)
2. Abolishment of office
Under 1 Comp. Laws Utah 1888, § 312, the municipality of Salt Lake City had the right to create the
office of inspector of provisions; and where a municipality has the power to create an office, it has, in
the absence of legislative restraint, the right to abolish it. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P.
812. Municipal Corporations c^ 126
3. Incumbents
A de facto incumbent of a public office is subject to removal at any time, and cannot complain of an
act by which such office is abolished. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812. Officers And
Public Employees <c^ 67
Where the incumbent of a public office assumes to act after the office has been abolished, he has no
legal claim against the municipality for services so performed. McAllister v. Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1,
50 P, 812. Municipal Corporations £~ 162.4
4. Department heads
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2004 Utah Laws Ch. 260 (S.B. 23)
UTAH 2004 SESSION LAWS
55th LEGISLATl IRE, 2004 GENERAL SESSION
1908
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Ch. 260 (S.B. 23)
WEST'S NO. 233
AMENDMENTS TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
This bill modifies provisions of the Utah Municipal Code relating to municipal officers and employees. This
bill modifies the officers and employees of a municipality to whom certain provisions relating to the duration
of employment and appeals from employment decisions apply; modifies the composition of an appeal board
for employment decisions; modifies the process for appealing an action or decision of the appeal board; expands circumstances covered by provisions relating to limitations on taking negative employment action; requires rather than permits the appeal board to provide that an employee receive back salary if the board finds
in favor of the employee; and makes technical changes.
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
10

:i

1105, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah. 1977

10-3-1106, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977
Be it enacted by the I legislature of the state of I Italii
Section 1. Section 10- 3-1105 is amended to read;
« U T S T § 10-3-1105 »
§ 10 3- 1105. Municipal employees—Duration and termination of employment—Exceptions.
AH appointive officers and employees of municipality > <^
.^
JLV,. >
partments, heads of departments, and superintendents,
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold their employment without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided., suspension of over two
days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in Section
10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the municipality;
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(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the classified civil
service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) afirechief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to define
cause for an employee termination or reduction in force.
Section 2. Section 10-3-1106 is amended to read:
« U T S T § 10-3-1106 »
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer—Appeals—Board—Procedure.
(1) No officer or An employee covered by to which Section 1 0 - 3 - 1 1 0 5 shall applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of his the employee's politics or religious belief,; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. In
all cases where any officer or
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred
from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, he shall have the right to the employee may,
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to
be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from
the appointive officers and employees, and two of whom shall be members of the governing body, established
under Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's
rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(2) The (3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of the an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the city municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a
copy of the same appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the
discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(3) The (4) An employee shall be entitled to who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and to be represented by counsel, to;
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(b) have a public hearing, to;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered,; and to
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may have 14 days
thereafter to appeal to the governing body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall be had.
(5) The (a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder
with within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board may, in its decision,, except as provided
in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of" 60
days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that an the employee shall receive his:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which he the employee is discharged, or suspended
without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period he during which the employee was transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged
or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at least a majority' of the membership of
the governing body of the municipality.
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken.
The employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the
recorder of the appeal board's decision, provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties during that next working day.
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing with that
court a notice of appeal.
(b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of determining if
the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, and the number of members, the
designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall
be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance, but the provisions for choosing the three
members from the appointed officers and employees shall in no way restrict a free selection of members by the
appointive officers and employees of the municipality.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Part 12,
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that
the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
Effective May 3,2004,
Approved March 23,2004.
U n EGIS 260 (2004)
UTLEGIS 260 (2004)
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U.C.A. 1953 § 1 0 - 3 - 1 0 0 2
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
* 1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government
* 1 Part 10. Civil Service Commission
* § 1 0 - 3 - 1 0 0 2 . Classified civil service—Places of employment constituting classified
civil service—Appointments to and from classified civil service

(1) The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment now existing or hereafter
created in or under the police department and the fire department of each first or second class city
that establishes a civil service commission and the health department in each first class city that
establishes a civil service commission, except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of the police
and fire departments, and assistant chiefs of the police department in cities of the first and second
class, and the members of the board of health of the departments.
(2) No appointments to any of the places of employment constituting the classified civil service in the
departments shall be made except according to law and under the rules and regulations of the civil
service commission.
(3) The head of each of the departments may, and the deputy chiefs of the police and fire
departments and assistant chiefs of the police department shall, be appointed from the classified civil
service, and upon the expiration of the term or upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned
thereto.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 44, § 1 ; Laws 2001, c. 178, S 4, eff. April 30 r 2001.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Demotion and Discharge of Municipal Employees in Utah. Kitzmiller, 16 Utah B J . 20 (April 2003).

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Municipal Corporations 0*484(2), 191, 197.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl84(2); 2 6 8 k l 9 1 ; 268kl97.
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 55 450 to 453, 474 to 476, 478 to 484, 505, 508, 535 to 538, 542,

544 to 546, 548 to 552, 568 to 569.
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1002, UT ST § 1 0 - 3 - 1 0 0 2
Current through 2010 General Session, including results from the November 2010 General Election.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*H Chapter 3. Municipal Government
*! Part 10. Civil Service Commission
-t § 10-3-1012. Suspension or discharge by department head-Appeal to commission—Hearing
and decision
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided in Section 10-3-912, or removed
from office or employment by the head of the department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform duties, or failure to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the suspended or discharged person to the civil service commission.

(2) Any person suspended or discharged may, within five daysfromthe issuance by the head of the department
of the order of suspension or discharge, appeal to the civil service commission, which shall fully hear and determine the matter.
(3) The suspended or discharged person shall be entitled to appear in person and to have counsel and a public
hearing.
(4) The finding and decision of the civil service commission upon the hearing shall be certified to the head of
the departmentfromwhose order the appeal is taken, and shall be final and immediately enforced by the head.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 221, § 2; Laws 2001, c. 178, § 6, eff. April 30,2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Municipal Corporations €=> 218(3), 218(8), 218(9).
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268k218(3); 268k218(8); 268k218(9).
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 599, 633, 635 to 636, 638 to 639, 641, 643 to 647.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Administrative review 20
Breach of duty, grounds for suspension or discharge 10
Cause, grounds for suspension or discharge 11

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Westlaw,
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1012.5

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*i Chapter 3. Municipal Government
*! Part 10. Civil Service Commission
-t § 10-3-1012.5. Appeal to Court of Appeals-Scope of review
Anyfinalaction or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The notice of
appeal shall befiledwithin 30 days of the issuance of the final action or order of the commission. The review by
Court of Appeals shall be on the record of the commission and shall be for the purpose of determining if the
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1991, c. 221, § 3; Laws 2010, c. 378, § 139, eff. May 11, 2010.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Kitzmiller, Demotion and Discharge of Municipal Employees in Utah, 16 Utah B.J. 20 (April 2003).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Municipal Corporations €=> 218(9).
Westlaw Key Number Search: 268k218(9).
CIS. Municipal Corporations §§ 633, 635 to 636, 638 to 639, 641, 644 to 647.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Certiorari 3
Determination and disposition 4
Due process 1
Evidence considered 1.5
Scope of review 2
1. Due process
Dismissal of former police officer's appeal of his employment termination for failure to comply with discovery
requirements did not violate officer's due process right to a post-deprivation hearing before city civil service
commission; officer not only ignored at least seven requestsfromthe city over the course often months, and admitted fault in failing to produce the requested material but, thereafter, failed to avail himself of onefinalopportunity to comply with city's request for the documents. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Joseph v. Salt Lake City
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*1 Chapter 3. Municipal Government
*1 Part 9. Appointed Officials and Their Duties
-+ § 10-3-918. Chief of police or marshal in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town
The chief of police or marshal in each city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town:

(1) shall:
(a) exercise and perform the duties that are prescribed by the legislative body;
(b) be under the direction, control, and supervision of the person or body that appointed the chief or marshal; and
(c) on or before January 1,2003, adopt a written policy that prohibits the stopping, detention, or search of any
person when the action is solely motivated by considerations of race, color, ethnicity, age, or gender; and
(2) may, with the consent of the person or body that appointed the chief or marshal, appoint assistants to the
chief of police or marshal.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 1983, c. 33, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 178, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 219, §
2, eff. July 1, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 292, § 24, eff. May 5, 2003.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Municipal Corporations €^> 182, 183.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl82; 268kl83.
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450 to 453, 457 to 472, 474 to 476, 505, 508.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Judicial review 1

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-919

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Westlaw*
U.CA. 1953 § 10-3-919

Page 1

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*! Chapter 3. Municipal Government
*§ Part 9. Appointed Officials and Their Duties
-f § 10-3-919. Powers, duties, and obligations of police chief, marshal, and their assistants in a
city of the third, fourth, orfifthclass or town
The chief of police, marshals, and their assistants in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or town shall have
all of the powers, rights, and duties respectively conferred on such officers in Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 2003, c. 292, § 25, eff. May 5, 2003.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Municipal Corporations €^> 182, 183(5).
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 268kl82; 268kl 83(5).
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 450 to 453, 457 to 466,471 to 472,474 to 476, 505, 508.
U.CA. 1953 § 10-3-919, UT ST § 10-3-919
Current through 2010 General Session, including resultsfromthe November 2010 General Election.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 53. Public Safety Code
*i Chapter 13. Peace Officer Classifications (Refs & Annos)
-+ § 53-13-103. Law enforcement officer
(l)(a) "Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer who is an employee of a law enforcement agency that is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose
primary and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal
statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions.

(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of any county, city, or town;
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member of the Department of Public Safety certified as a
peace officer;
(iii) all persons specified in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 79-4-501;
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university;
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division;
(vi) special agents or investigators employed by the attorney general, district attorneys, and county attor- neys;
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated as peace officers by law;
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of education for the school district;
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and any correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the executive director and approved by the commissioner of public safety and certified by the division;
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(x) correctional enforcement, investigative, or adult probation and parole officers employed by the Department of Corrections serving on or before July 1,1993;
(xi) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private college or university provided that the
college or university has been certified by the commissioner of public safety according to rules of the Department of Public Safety;
(xii) airport police officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions; and
(xiii) transit police officers designated under Section 17B-2a-823.
(2) Law enforcement officers may serve criminal process and arrest violators of any law of this state and have
the right to require aid in executing their lawful duties.
(3)(a) A law enforcement officer has statewide full-spectrum peace officer authority, but the authority extends to
other counties, cities, or towns only when the officer is acting under Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh
Pursuit, unless the law enforcement officer is employed by the state.
(b)(i) A local law enforcement agency may limit the jurisdiction in which its law enforcement officers may
exercise their peace officer authority to a certain geographic area.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a law enforcement officer may exercise his authority outside of
the limited geographic area, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, if the officer is
pursuing an offender for an offense that occurred within the limited geographic area.
(c) The authority of law enforcement officers employed by the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title
64, Chapter 13, Department of Corrections-State Prison.
(4) A law enforcement officer shall, prior to exercising peace officer authority, satisfactorily complete:
(a) the basic course at a certified law enforcement officer training academy or pass a certification examination
as provided in Section 53-6-206, and be certified; and
(b) annual certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the director of the division, with the
advice and consent of the council.
CREDIT(S)
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Laws 1985, c. 174, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 69, § 9; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 58; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 86; Laws 1993, c.
103, § 5; Laws 1993, c. 234. § 388; Laws 1997, c. 315, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 282, § 44, eff. Mav
4, 1998; Laws 2001, c. 296, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 347, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c.
329, § 410, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 344, § 12, eff. May 12, 2009.
Codifications C. 1953, § 77-la-l.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Renumbered from § 53-10-103 by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel to avoid duplication
in numbering.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concealed firearm, permit to carry, see § 53-5-704.
County sheriff, additional qualifications, see § 17-22-1.5.
Custodial sexual relations, misconduct, penalties and defenses, see § 76-5-412.
Custodial sexual relations or misconduct with youth, see § 76-5-413.
Education benefit plan for law enforcement and correctional officers, see § 67-19-12.2.
Licensure, exemptions, see § 58-1-307.
Park rangers, peace officer authority, see § 79-4-501.
Peace officer, correctional officer, and public safety personnel pay plans, see § 67-19-12.3.
Peace officers, training and certification, see § 53-6-201 et seq.
Personal use of state vehicles for law enforcement officers, see § 67-5-233.
Public Safety Code, see § 53-1-101 et seq.
Public Safety Contributory Retirement Act, disputes over positions to be covered, see §§ 49-14-201 and
49-15-201.
Underinsured motorist coverage, application to this section, see § 31A-22-305.3.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REFERENCES
Private colleges and universities, certification of law enforcement agencies within institutions, see Utah
Admin. Code 698-4.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
States €==> 69.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 360k69.
C.J.S. States §§ 120, 136.
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Evidence wrongfully obtained 2
Jurisdictional limit 1
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
M Chapter 23B. Access to Electronic Communications
-• § 77-23b-6. Notifying subscriber or customer of court order-Requested delay-Grounds-Limits
(l)(a) The governmental entity acting under Subsection 77-23b-4 (2) may:

(i) if a court order is sought, include in the application a request for an order delaying the notification requirement under Subsection 77-23b-4(2) for not to exceed 90 days and, if the court determines there is reason to believe that notification of existence of the court order may have an adverse result under Subsection
(l)(b), the court shall grant the order; or
(ii) if an administrative subpoena authorized by a state or federal statute or a state or federal grand jury subpoena is obtained, delay the notification required under Subsection 77-23b-4(2) for not to exceed 90 days,
upon the execution of a written certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe that the
notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result under Subsection (l)(b).
(b) An adverse result under Subsection (l)(a) is:
(i) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
(ii) flightfromprosecution;
(iii) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(iv) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(v) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.
(c) The governmental entity shall maintain a true copy of certification under Subsection (l)(a)(ii).
(d) Extensions of the delay of notification under Section 77-23b-4 of up to 90 days each, may be granted by
the court upon application, or by certification by a governmental entity, but only in accordance with Subsection (2).
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(e) On expiration of the period of delay of notification under Subsection (l)(a) or (d), the governmental entity
shall serve upon, or deliver by registered orfirstclass mail, to the customer or subscriber a copy of the process
or request together with a notice:
(i) stating with reasonable specificity the nature of the law enforcement inquiry; and
(ii) informing the customer or subscriber:
(A) that information maintained for the customer or subscriber by the service provider named in the process or request was supplied to or requested by that governmental authority and the date the supplying or
request took place;
(B) that notification of the customer or subscriber was delayed;
(C) which governmental entity or court made the certification or determination pursuant to which that
delay was made; and
(D) which provision of this chapter allows the delay.
(f) As used in this subsection, "supervisory official" means the investigative agent in charge or assistant investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of an investigative agency's headquarters or regional office; a
county sheriff or chief deputy sheriff, or police chief or assistant police chief; the officer in charge of an investigative task force or the assistant officer in charge; or the attorney general, an assistant attorney general, a
county attorney or district attorney, a deputy county attorney or deputy district attorney, or the chief prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision of the state.
(2) A governmental entity acting under Section 77-23b-4, when not required to notify the subscriber or customer
under Subsection 77-23b-4 (2)(a), or to the extent that it may delay notice under Subsection (1), may apply to a
court for an order commanding the provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service
to whom a warrant, subpoena, or court order is directed, for a period of time the court considers appropriate, to
not notify any other person of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order. The court shall enter the order if it determines that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or
court order will result in:
(a) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
(b) flight from prosecution;
(c) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
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(d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(e) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1988, c. 251, § 20; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 101.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Telecommunications © ^ 528.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 372k528.
C.J.S. Telegraphs, Telephones, Radio, and Television §§ 302 to 303.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-23b-6, UT ST § 77-23b-6
Current through 2010 General Session, including resultsfromthe November 2010 General Election.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 68. Statutes
* i Chapter 3. Construction
-t § 68-3-3. Retroactive effect
A provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive.

CREDIT(S)
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2490; C.L. 1907, § 2490; C.L. 1917, § 5840; R.S. 1933, § 88-2-3; C. 1943, § 88-2-3.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2010, c. 254, § 7, rewrote the section, which formerly read:

"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."

CROSS REFERENCES
Ex post facto laws or laws impairing contracts prohibited, see Const. Art. 1, § 18.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Statutes €^z> 262 to 263, 271.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 361k262 to 361k263; 361k271.
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 408, 413, 415 to 416, 420.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
Acknowledgment 6
Corporations 5
Criminal convictions, criminal proceedings 16
Criminal proceedings 12-17
Criminal proceedings - Criminal convictions 16
Criminal proceedings - Death penalty 12
Criminal proceedings - Guilty and mentally ill persons 17
Criminal proceedings - Guilty pleas 13
Criminal proceedings - Limitation of prosecutions 15

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT 2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OtKllMtD

UUKY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-o'OoDANIEL PEARSON
Case No. 090914481 '

Plaintiff,

ORAL ARGUMENTS

vs •
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,
Defendant..

)

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of February,
2010, commencing at the hour of 10:02 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KATE TOOMEY,
sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of
this cause, and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOo-

DEPOMAXMERI'
LITIGATION SERVICES
TOLL FREE B00-337-5S29

3 3 3 SOUTH RIO GRANDE
S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH B4101.

P H O N E 801-328-118B

WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A T o A n t T l P i K l i~\rr O i l I A I r r v -

FAX 801-32B-1189

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the State:

For the Defendant:

CHAD D.. NOAKES
Attorney at Law
Skordas, Caston & Hyde
341 South-Main Street, #303
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS. CAMILLE N. JOHNSON
Attorneys at Law
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange -Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah ' 84145

* * *

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note: • Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

THE COURT:

This is the matter of Pearson vs. City

of South Jordan, it's Case No. 090914481.
Please state your appearances.
MR. NOAKES:

Chad Noakes on behalf of the plaintiff,

with my client, Dan Pearson-.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. JOHNSON:

Camille Johnson and Judy Wolferts on

behalf of the City of South Jordan.
THE COURT:

All right.

Welcome, everybody.

I was preparing for this oral argument this morning
by reviewing the things that have been submitted and noted
that a memorandum in opposition to the counter-motion for
partial summary judgment is not in the file.

And the docket

doesn't reflect that we have ever received it.

And I noted.,

from your notice to submit and from your responsive..-.."
..memorandum, that one has been .prepared and served on you but
it's not in the file. •
So, I—I want to.call that to your attention, Mr..
3
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1

Noakes, because I — I T m going to need you to file it.

2

MS. JOHNSON:

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, may I address that?
Sure.
What we did receive in response to our

5

Cross-Motion' for Summary Judgment was Plaintiff T s Memorandum

6

in Opposition to City of South Jordan T s Cross-Motion for

7

Partial"Summary Judgment.

8

memorandum—

9
10

THE COURT:

We did not ever receive a reply

Okay.

And—and—okay.

And m a y b e — b u t —

but the memorandum in opposition isn ! t in here.

11

MS. JOHNSON:

Okay.

12

THE COURT:

13

file it and then I T 11 read it.

14

MR. NOAKES:

So, Mr. Noakes, I assure that you can

So, it ! s just—it's just incorrect

15

t h e n — y o u do not have a copy of our'memorandum in opposition

16

to- City of South Jordan's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary

17

Judgment?

18

THE COURT:

Correct.

Correct.

Let m e — l e t me tell

19

you what I have.

20

Authorities in Support of Mr. Pearson's Motion for Partial

21

Summary Judgment, T have the City T s combined Memorandum in

. 22

r have the Memorandum of Points and

' -Support of ".the 'City"' s Motion for. Partial Summary Judgment and

23

in'opposition to Mr. Pearson's Motion,

24

entry and that was filed on November 12th.

' 25

Then the next docket
The.next docket

entry is December 21 and 'it's the City's Reply in Support of
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its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

There's nothing

else.
So, if a reply memorandum was prepared, itTs never
been filed and if a memorandum in opposition-to the City's
motion, has been prepared,•it's never been filed.
MR. NOAKES:
THE COURT:

And—and I —
So, I think ITm missing at least one and

possibly two memoranda from your side.
MR. NOAKES:

Well, there—there would only be one

memoranda issue, which is our Memorandum in—in opposition—
THE COURT:

In opposition to the City's motion?

MR. NOAKES:* --at which point that* we—we covered
all- the bases that we felt like we needed.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, we're not looking for a reply

m.emo, but we are looking for the memorandum in. opposition?
MR. NOAKES: "Yes. And I—and I do have, and I guess
we'll have to reconstruct what happened with the Court.

I—

well, I would say that I'm certain that at our office, we have
a filed version, a stamped, filed version of that.
THE COURT:

I'm not doubting you on that and—and I

note from the CityTs notice to submit in which, you know, they
identified everything that they think has .been filed, that on
December 9th, Mr. Pearson filed his memorandum in opposition
to the City's motion for a partial summary judgment.
know you've seen it.
5
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So, I

MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
I just want to make clear, I haven1t

seen it and I need to. see it.
MS. JOHNSON:

So—

And should I—-I think I know what

happened, looking at it more carefully now.

It says Third

Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, West Jordan, State
of Utah, on the opposition memorandum. ' My guess is it got
filed in West Jordan.
THE COURT:

Maybe.

But at any rate and—and I just

want to assure Mr. Pearson that I*will take into account
everything that I need to take into account.

But what I would

propose today is-that you'argue it, I'll take it under
advisement and then you make -sure I get a copy of it.
"MR. NOAKES:

And—and-I'm confident that although

our—our memorandum in opposition is important, thereTs a —
certainly a—a theme of issues that are worked .through in our
motion for summary judgment.
THE COURT:
MR. NOAKES:
THE COURT:

I would—I would think so.
I feel-Now, alternatively, if you feel that—

that I just really need to read it before I hear the argument,
we can postpone this hearing.
too.

I—I mean, I'm fine with that,

But I just want to make sure that ultimately—
MR. NOAKES: -I'm—I T m certainly—,
THE COURT:

— I get everything I need together.
6
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MR. NOAKES:

Absolutely.

And ITm certainly

comfortable moving forward with oral argument—
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

MR. NOAKES: —and I'll be sure that you have a — a
copy of that within—
• THE COURT:

All right.

Yeah.

And I—and I!m sorry,

I tend not .to prepare for hearings like this until right
before them, because, unfortunately, because of the volume of
stuff that I have, if I had read this last week, I wouldn't
remember it.

So,—so, I, you know, anyway, so, I did not

discover this until this morning.
Okay. -So, .are you ready to-proceed?
MR. NOAKES:
THE COURT:
MR. NOAKES:

I_ am, your Honor.
Thank you.
Your Honor, as the City points out, I

believe, in its reply memorandum, this case has arrived here
through a long and kind of -curious journey.
THE- COURT:

Yeah.

And it apparently has been all '"

over the valley, s o —
•MR. NOAKES:

And certainly, weTre optimistic that

today, here, with this Court, we'll be able to arrive at the
destination that my client has been hoping for for some time .
and that is to have judicial review of the. statute at issue,
Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1105.
THE COURT:

Right.
7
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1

MR. NOAKES: . So, that that statute can be .

2

interpreted and applied to the facts which fortunately in this

3

"case, at least the relevant facts don't appear to be disputed.

4

As I see it, there are three different

5

interpretations that the Court might reach of the particular

6

statute as it applies to my client's case.

•7

that the statute provides affirmative rights and protections

8

to a group-of-employees•and then -excludes from thpse

9

protections a enumerated list of particular position.

10

The first would be

The Court may find, as we certainly argue, that my

11

client is not among those positions excluded and therefore, he

12 .

enjoys the protections that are offered by 10-3-1105 and in

13

that event, the result would be, is that my client's

14-

termination, which is not disputed, was based on the finding

15

that he was mandatorily an' at will employee under that

16

statute, that that finding would have been inaccurate.

17

The second finding that would be potential is for

IB

the Court to find that in fact my client's position was among

19

those excluded positions; however, adopting our interpretation

20

that 10-3-1105 is an affirmative statute, meaning that it

21

simply bestows-on certain individuals additional rights, but

22

that it doesn't take away anybody's rights or mandate the at

23'

will status of any employee.

24 •
25

Under that interpretation, my client's position then
would simply be unaffected by the statute and again, we would
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1

argue that because the City T s basis for the termination was

2

its interpretation that the statute mandates the at will

3

status, that again that—the basis for that termination would

4

be contrary to the law.

5

Of course, the final interpretation would be what

6

the City is advocating for, which is that the statute mandates

7

his at will status.

8

motion and the cross-motions are both partial summary

9

judgments is because there are some additional issues; namely,

Under that finding, the reason that our

10

that if, even though—even if the Court were to find that he

11

were mandatorily an at will employee, there 1 s an issue o f — o f

12

whether or not the City acted incorrectly when it extended

13

what we argue to be an employment contract.

14

THE COURT:

Sure.

And I — I noticed that you have a

15

(inaudible) estoppel claim a n d — a n d you know, and .things like

16

that, s o —

17
18

MR. NOAKES:
-

Yeah.

simple and straightforward.

O u r — o u r argument i s — i s very
When we read the statute, my

19

client 1 s position is not among those listed as being excluded.

20

What the City argues for is for-the Court to broaden its

21

interpretation, find that the statute-is ambiguous and then

22

adopt a new standard that it is proposing, which I would call

• 23

the second-in-command standard, that is that the evaluation

24

should be whether or not my client T s position, or any

25

position, for that matter, is second in order behind a police
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1

chief.

2

absurd result, which is that somebody that is second in

•3

command is still protected" by the statute.

4

•

And it argues that, if not, it will result in a — a n

I argue that it ! s exactly the opposite.

Currently,

5

in Utah, police departments have a wide variety of different

6

structures that they can put together with lieutenants and

7

sergeants and captains and those are and should be based on

8'

the relevant statute.

9

And there are a number of individuals,

' a number of sergeants, a number of lieutenants, another o f — o f

•10

deputy police chiefs and assistant police chiefs, who, if you

11

went back a n d — a n d simply applied a second-in-command statute

12

or"interpretation, may suddenly be at will, even though it's

13

not the understanding of, or intent of any of those

14

individuals to make that person at will, simply because they

15

happen to be the person of greatest authority aside from the •

16

police chief.

17

a new standard and the statute is simply not that—that

18

ambiguous and certainly doesn T t imply that that type of new

19

standard should'it be taken.

'20 •

to have taken a second-in-command standard and made it so

21

That would create a — a new legal precedent and

"Were it the legislature's intent

• broad, I believe it clearly would have done so and I don't

22

believe that there is ambiguity in this statute simply because

23

there a r e — t h e City can find other positions that potentially

24

could or could -not have been included.

25

The statute, the way that it's set up is to identify
10
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1

particular positions and exclude those and I find it very

2

telling with respect to the assistant fire chief.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NOAKES:

Well, it says deputy or assistant.
Uh huh (affirmative).

And—and I find

5

it interesting that it says that the "or assistant" so that it

6

intentionally includes both of those, but doesn't share the

7

same language with a police chief, it simply says deputy, the

8

word "deputy""simply an all-encompassing term that either

9

would have not included assistant with respect to fire chiefs

10

or they would have used the same language in addressing police'

11

chiefs.

12

that it's consistent.

It would say deputy or assistant police chiefs so

13

The way that I—and again, the—the approach I —

14

THE COURT:

15
16

Well, the omission has to be meaningful,

doesn't it?
MR. NOAKES:

The omission has to.be—certainly, i f —

17

if the omission, if they include assistant with fire chiefs

18

but don't include it with police chiefs, I believe that that

19

has to be given some reasonable explanation.

20

explanation would simply be that the intent of the -statute is

21

to name particular positions, based on title, and if a city

22

chooses to give that person that particular title so that it's

'23

covered by the statute, then so be it.

24
25

And the

If a city chooses, not

to, then that is the- prerogative of the city.
And I believe that the approach that the city would
11
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1

have is that the statute is—somehow should conform to the

2

norms of what cities do, where my argument is, is that the

'•'3

statute is there and the—the cities have the responsibility

4

to conform their structure to the statute.

And that allows

5

people, such as my client, in assessing a job offer that's

6

made as a merit employee, one that sits down and talks about

7

the terms of his employment and is recruited on the basis of

8

coming over to a merit employee position, my client should

9

have the ability to turn to the statute and to determine

10

whether or not that is consistent with the law or determine

11

whether or not he's going to be mandatorily an at will

12

employee, because certainly at will status is a significant,

13

if not one of the most significant considerations that

14

somebody might take in determining, am I taking an employment

15

position where I can simply be dismissed at any time?

16.

this something that I can count on for myself and my family?

17

Or is

If I could make a few notes about the City's reply.

18

I—I do—we don't disagree that the City makes the argument

19

that we do not dispute that my client is—was the second in

20

command.

21

at the hearing which infer that he was the position beneath a

22

We don't dispute the statements that my client made

' police chief.

What • I want to make sure that the distinction

23

that's made is, is that we don't believe that saying second in

24

command had any particular legal significance because second

25

in command is not a—a term upon which the statute is built or
12
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1

the relevant case law is built.

2

So, in—in admitting that he stated that he was •

3

second in command, we're not admitting that we agree that he

4

falls under a particular legal classification or that there is

5

a—a framework that should be provided.
And again, ITm aware that there is a number of—of

6
7

police departments and—and employees of police departments

8

who are—have followed this case and are very curious to see

9

how this case will pan out -and the reason is, as I think that

10

they correctly observe, that—that agreeing with the City

11

would create a—a new standard that could be detrimental to

12

other employees.

13-

certainly a red flag in terms of whether or not it's—we're

14

simply interpreting a statute with the plain language or

15

whether -or not we're going beyond in trying to guess at

16

• perhaps what the—what the legislature would have wanted.

17
18

And I think as soon as we see that, it's a —

If the Court has any questions?

If not, I'll submit

it.

19

THE COURT:

No.

Thank you.

20

MR. NOAKES:- Thank you.

21

MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, the resolution of these

22

cross-motions for summary judgment is really a matter of

23

statutory construction of Section 10-3-1105 and a

24

determination whether South Jordan's assistant police chief

25

position was at will under that statute.
13
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1

And let me talk to you just a little bit about

2

Section 10-3-1105 and its significance.

3

municipal employees as at will, including a police chief, a

4

deputy police chief and a deputy of a head of a municipal

5

department.

6

identified is that they are not therefore m e r i t employees -and

7

not entitled to the process that it laid out in Section

8

10-3-1106, when they're terminated.

9

It identifies

certain

And the significance to those people who are

Those at will employees identified under section

10

10-3-1105 can be terminated incident to or through changes in

11

city government.

12

administration takes hole, a new mayor, a new city council, a

13

new city administrator comes into play, it's important that

14

city government have the flexibility to make sure that these

15

appointed people h a v e — s h a r e the same vision for the city.

16

And this makes sense because as a new

Now, Mr. Pearson contends that w e should look simply

17

at the plain language of Section 10-3-1105, Subsection ( d ) r

18

t h a t — t h a t paragraph that refers to a deputy police chief and-

19

-and because he did not have the title of deputy police chief,

20

he believes "that that plain language solves it all, but

21

because Section 10-3-1105 and particularly Subsection 2(d) can

22

be reasonably understood to have more than one plausible

23

meaning, the courts d e t e r m i n e d — h a v e determined that under

24

those circumstances, the statute and the statutory language is

25 '

ambiguous.
14
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THE COURT:

Well, then, why doesnTt it say deputy or

assistant the way-that it does with regard to the fire
department?
MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, I believe the legislature

provided a catch-all when it identified a deputy of a head of
a municipal department.

And the reason that the statute is

susceptible to two interpretations is because you can either
have someone with the precise title of deputy police chief or
it can refer to a category of employees who hold a position
thatTs really second in command.
Itrs important in order to assess, really, the
meaning of the statute to look not just at that particular
line, but the statute as a whole and the courts have said we
can interpret the provisions in harmony with other related
statutes in other—in the same or related chapters.

And so

thatTs the approach the City's taken is that we need to look
at the whole -statute and of course, look at other related
statutory chapters.
But let me focus just on that line for a minute.
Consider what a deputy is.

Black1s Law Dictionary defines it

as a substitute, a person duly authorized by an officer to
exercise some or all of the functions pertaining to the office
in the place and stead of the latter.
And that's exactly the position that Mr. Pearson
•held, admittedly.

He doesnTt deny that he didnTt hold—that
15
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1

he—that he held the—the deputy position, it's just that he

2

says, my title was assistant, not deputy.

3
4
5
6

Black's Law Dictionary defines assistant as a
deputy.

The two terms are really synonymous and that!s the

' plain language of the statute.
THE COURT:

But isn't it at least possible that a

7

municipality would adopt job titles purposefully to either

B

fall within the reach of the statute or not?

9

I think itTs foreseeable, certainly;

MS. JOHNSON:

10

but I also think that it's foreseeable and anticipated that

11

cities are going to rely upon the general categories, theyTre

12

going to rely upon the category of deputy in identifying their

13

people and we know that most cities do not have a deputy

14*

police chief.

15

think they' re relying upon the catch-all or the concept that a

16

deputy refers to someone who substitutes for the chief.

17*
18

They have an assistant police chief.

So, I

And I think it's curious, when you look at the
• language, the statute doesn't say "the deputy police chief,"

19

it says ,Ta deputy of police chief."

20

the indefinite article that's used "a" rather than "the", a

21

definite article, s o —

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. JOHNSON:

It's — a n d it's the—it's

Suggesting there could be more than one?
But what—exactly.

Suggesting that

24

it's a category, "a" deputy, not "the" deputy, but "a"' deputy.

25

Now, if you look' at—again, look at the text of the
16
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statute as a whole, not just the plain language of that line,
you see that the legislature has identified a whole category
of people who are at will and those are deputies of heads of a
municipal department, .again, using the indefinite article, "a"
deputy of the head of a municipal department.

Again

indicating, when you look at the statute as a whole, it—the
legislature intended for a category-type, or position-type
approach.
And then let me focus in on the language of some of
the other provisions that I think are—are helpful to the
Court.

Under the—under Utah's Civil Service Commission

statute and this is the statute that deals with cities of the
first and second class.
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

MS. JOHNSON:

Both deputies and assistant police

chiefs are considered at will.

And so, those terms are used

interchangeably in the Civil Service Commission statute.
This is the observed results that we talked about in
our briefing.

If you could have, for example, a deputy and an

assistant police chief in a city of the first class, both
being identified as at will, whereas in a city like South
Jordan, where we've—I—we've used the title "assistant police
chief," we don't have an at will employee, whereas if they
were a deputy, they would be.

So, it's an inconsistent

result, especially in keeping with the Civil Service
17
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1

Commission rules.

2

There's another statute that deals with the cities

3

of the-third, fourth and fifth class and in this particular

4

statute, it!s 10-3-918, it talks about a—a chief of police

5

• and a marshall being treated the same, even though the titles

6

are different.

7

They are—they are treated as one.

And so, under the proposal that Mr. Pearson

8

suggests, someone who is identified as a police marshall in a

9

city of the third, fourth or fifth class, would—would be

10

entitled to the protections of 10-3-1106 and not be at will,

11

whereas the person who is identified as the police chief would

12

be appointed and not entitled to those protections.

13

again, an inconsistent result.

14

these terms to substitute one for the other.

So,

And-the legislature has used

There!s a case that's worth looking at, itT s Ward

15
16

vs. Richfield, and itfs a 1989 case, so, it T s the predecessor

17

statute to the one we1re looking at.

18

said that any member of. a police department was exempt and at

19

will under 10-3-1105.

20

referred to, his title was city marshall.

21

That predecessor statute

And the city employee in that case was

And the Court.of Appeals found and then the Supreme

22

Court affirmed that Section 10-3-1105 made him an at will

23

employee.

24

department, because the statutory language referred to member

25

of a police department, he said, I'm a city marshall, I'm the

He was arguing, I'm not a member of the .police •

18
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1

.city marshall.

2

And the—and the court said no, they said because

3

other sections in title can refer interchangeably between a

4

chief of police and a city marshall, the—the 10-3-1105 at

5

will provisions applied to Mr. Ward in the case, in that

6

Richfield City case.

7

understand the court's approach to the broad reading of those-

8

-of those titles.

9

One worth looking at because it helps us

I mentioned the Civil Service Commission provision.

10

There's also Utah's Criminal Code refers interchangeably

11

between an assistant police chief and—and someone who's the

12

second in command in the police department and all of that's

13

found in our brief.

14

I think it's'significant that the Utah Code doesn't

15

dictate how municipalities title their police department and

16

hierarchy.

It—it—the courts really—

17

THE COURT:

IB

MS. JOHNSON:

19

It's interesting.
Yeah.

It kind of anticipates that

we're going to use the term, "chief," "marshall,"—

20

THE COURT: Right.

21

MS. JOHNSON:

—"commissioner," "director,"

22

"deputy," "assistant," and I think' that's why that catch-all

23

provision, Subparagraph (h), that a deputy of a head of a

24

municipal department makes all of those people at will.

25

The courts have said that when you've got an
19
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ambiguity in.a statute like this one, you can look beyond the
statutory language and beyond the statute as a whole and
beyond the text of other statutes in the-same chapter and look
at.policy consideration and also_ the undisputed facts to help
resolve the ambiguity.
So, let me' focus for just a minute on the policy
considerations and I mentioned this right at the beginning.
10-3-1105 was entitl—it was intended to except from the
protections of 1106 those employees who are policy makers and
policy implementers.

And the—and the police chief and his

second in command are directly involved in a meaningful way in
the administration of the police department. 'Just because the
City chooses the term "assistant" as opposed to "deputy,"
doesnTt have any bearing on the policy reasons behind allowing
for at will termination of these people, particularly as city
government changes.
And I think one of the other important parts to
these policy considerations is that the City should not have
to always be conforming their job descriptions and job titles
to the statute because the legislature provided that catch-all
provision.
Turning to the u n —
' THE COURT:

But again, I think it could be

purposeful.
MS. JOHNSON:

I think it could be purposeful, your
20
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Honor, but I think, given the context, looking at the plain
language of the statute, the statute as a whole and Chapter 10
and where you see that the legislature has clearly used these
terms interchangeably with respect to police departments, that,
'catch-all provision was purposeful, it was to give the cities
an opportunity to collectively pull all these second in
commands in, all of these "A" deputy types so that they1re
all—they're all at will employees.
I just want to mention and Mr. Noakes did briefly,
the undisputed facts in this case, because while they believe
that they1re not relevant to the determinations, courts have
said that undisputed facts may be considered when youTre
helping to resolve the ambiguity in a statute.
And here, we know that Mr. Pearson acknowledges that
he was second in command, we know that the letterhead showed
him as the chief of police operations for a time.

He admitted

that his responsibilities required him to take over as police
chief when the chief wasnTt available.
We also know that when he was hired back in 2002, it
was the earlier statute we were looking at and all members of
the police department were at will employees under Section
10-3-1105.
So, your Honor, reading the plain language of
Section 10-3-1105 and the text of the statute as a whole and
interpreting its provisions in harmony with the other chapters
21
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1

that we've discussed, I think the ambiguity is resolved in

2

favor of interpreting the phrase "deputy" to mean a category

3

of -employees who hold that second in command spot.

4
5

Policy considerations and the undisputed facts in
.

this .case'also support, that determination and we ask the Court

6

to find that, given the statutory construction. 10-3-1105, Mr.

7

Pearson was an at will employee as the assistant police chief

8

in the City of South Jordan.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MS. JOHNSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. NOAKES:

13

First, I'd like to address my interpretation of what

'14

Thank you.

Mr. Noakes?
Thank you, your Honor.

the city refers to as a catch-all provision.

My argument is

15

that the purpose of that provision is because it is difficult

16

to predict what new agencies or departments a municipality may

17

choose to—to construct.

18

create a new department, a public service, a public safety,

19

something that would not make it, for example, a police

20

department.

Municipalities are always free to

21

I believe that the—that quote, unquote, catch-all

22

provision is—simply meant that if there is a new department

23

that's created, that you can then simply have a—the head of

24

that department or if- you have a deputy head of that

25

department to be covered by the statute.

And that approach is

22
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1

consistent with the enumeration of so many specific positions

2

within the statute.

3

Were the catch-all provision simply to be read that

4

any deputy would be considered an at will employee, then there

5

would have been no need to have the specific enumerations that

6

are listed, there simply could have-been that one provision,

7

they could have—or they could have simply said, you know, a

8

head or a, you know, deputy of a municipal department is at

9

will and—and not go any further than-that, because they've

10

already covered all the positions.

11

Rather, the way the city wants to read it, they went

12

• through and listed very specific positions of superintendent,

13

et cetera, et cetera and then at the end, include this giant

14

catch-all provision.

15

consistent interpretation is that they're referring to the

16

variance there can be in departments with a new municipality

17

and not that particular position.

18 .

Again, I think that a reasonable and

An interesting result of' a looking beyond a title

19

and asking questions, for example, is well, if that person—

20

that person's second in command if they make a policy

21

decision.

22

would, easily be hired as a non at will employee and end up as

23

an at will employee because they work into a more policy

24

driven role and then potentially a modification fall out of

25

that.

Suddenly, we have a circumstance where somebody

I—I just—there!s—there's even more ambiguity than—
23
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1

than anything found in the statute when we create a standard

2

that isn't discussed and would be very difficult to define,

3

what is exactly a second in command.

4

Of note, there is—there has been no evidence

5

presented that my client was a policy maker, that he had ever

6

made any policy decisions within the decision.

7

we're applying the second in command, well, does that m a k e —

8

does'that mean that he falls outside, would-that change it if

9

he had?

Suddenly, when

Again, we get into an analysis that's m u c h — s o fact-

io-

detailed that—that it T s just inconsistent with a basic plain

11

language, title specific provision.

12

And to my knowledge and my understanding, police

13

departments and fire departments, they are absolutely title

14

driven agencies.

15

sergeant to a captain.

16

something that is foreign-at all to cities or that we would

17

think that the legislature would say, oh, we're—we're going

18

to confuse them by making this title specific.

19

There is working up from a lieutenant to a
The title specific approach is not

Also, if w e — m y — m y argument is that certainly, that

20

we should be looking at what the statute was at the time my

21

client was terminated.

22

time that my client was hired is more relevant to the contract

23

question; however, if w e — i f we do look at what was the—the.

24

statusr I think we also then have to take into consideration,

25

that gets us into t h e — t o the document that my client received

I think the statute- as it was at the

24 •
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1

at the time when he was hired, which specifically states that

2

department heads and probationary employees are at will.

3

you're not a department head and once youTre out of the

4

probationary stage, you1re no longer a probationary employee.

5

Again, I think that the more relevant argument deals with what

6

the statute is, but if we want to look back and start asking,

7

okay, what exactly was it when he was hired, either -the city

8

didnTt know, didnTt understand the statute or their policy was

9

simply in violation of the law and it's very difficult for

10
11

If

them to go back and try to reconstruct that.
So, again, my—my argument is, is that there is n o —

12 '

well, the—and again, the—the statute in this case needs to

13

be applied to the specific circumstances.

14

day, although this may present some precedent for future

15

cases, that it is a fact specific case where the Court has the

'16

At the end of the

ability to say under the circumstances of the hiring and

17

everything that we know, about Mr. Pearson and the way that

18

South Jordan did things, is it fair for the City to rely on

19

this statute and to call him in and terminate him without

20

saying anything other than, we're letting you go because

21

you're an at will employee and there was no discussion as to

22

whether or not you are an at will employee, look at the

23

statute, the statute says you're an at will employee.

24
25

So, under the circumstances, I think we can look
specifically at the way South Jordan was—the way that he was
25
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1

hired, which was specifically as a merit employee as I

2

interpret the employment contract and that their structure was

3

a title specific structure, he was—he was brought in as an

4

assistant employee, where his employment status was discussed

5

and then, -reviewing the relevant statutes and my client

6

understanding the basics of the statutes, was put in a

7

position essentially where he had to, potentially, the City's

8

arguing that they offered him an- illegal contract.

9

the—the better resolution is to simply say that there was a

I think

10

mistake made in interpreting the statute, it's going to be

11

different, potentially, for different individuals who may.be

12

in different capacities within other organizations, but as it

13

applies to my client, who was an assistant police chief within

14

South Jordan, he was hired as a merit employee, he as not

15

excluded from the—from the protections and he should be found

16

to be a merit employee, or simply not—certainly not a member

17

of an at will employee.

18

And again, I know the City—City has a different

19

interpretation, but I've read the statute, many, many, many

20

times and I simply do not read that as—the current statute as

21

• intending to take away the rights that a city might want to

22

have to hire an assistant police chief as a merit employee; in

23

fact, and—and the legislature doesn't indicate that—

24

THE COURT:

Right.

'25

think it could be purposeful.

And that's why I suggested I

26
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1

MR. NOAKES:

So, again, I—I agree.

I believe it

2

was purposeful and I believe that my client would be entitled

3

to summary judgment on that matter.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. NOAKES:

6

THE COURT:

7

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you, your Honor.
Ms. Johnson, would you like to add

anything?

8

MS. JOHNSON:

Just—just briefly, your Honor.

9

Just a note that to the extent Mr. Noakes argues

10

about any contract that was made, that is outside the summary-

11

-the cross-motions for summary judgment.

12
13
14
15
16

Let me address his argument that Subsection (h) is
not a catch-all.

Mr. Noakes argues that it!s just simply for

.new departments that may be created, that aren't otherwise
identified in Section 10-3-1105.
Let me go back to the analysis under 10-3-918 about

17

a city marshall being the same as a city police chief in

18

cities of the—of the third, fourth and fifth class.

19

that's the case, we know then that a city marshall is the head

20

of a municipal department-and so naturally, his deputy, his

21

second in command would be exempt under—under Subsection (h).

22

If

The notion is that that catch-all isn't intended

23

just for newly-created city departments, but applies to the

24

situations like we see in Section 10-3-91B where you've got

25

the term city—or police chief and marshall being used
27
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1

interchangeably.

2

those would then be at will.

3

So, the deputy—deputy of either one of

And I just want to call the Court's attention to one

4

last thing and that is, at the time that Mr. Pearson was

5

terminated, the letterhead stationery did identify Lindsay

6

Shepherd as the Director of Public Safety and it identified

7

Mr. Pearson as the chief of police.

8

as the second in command, but he as identified as the chief of

9

police.

He was essentially acting

Again, this is an example of Section (h) providing a'

10

catch-all for circumstances where a city, for whatever

11

purpose, needs to reorganize a particular department.

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. JOHNSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay.

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you.
Mr. Noakes, can you get me that brief by

Friday?

16

MR. NOAKES:

17

THE COURT:

18

I T m going to take this under advisement and I'll get

19

Oh, absolutely, your Honor. .
All right.. Thank you.

you a decision as soon as I can.

20

MR. NOAKES:

Thank you, your Honor.

21

(Whereupon, this, hearing was concluded.)

22
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DANIEL PEARSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 090914481

CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,

DATE: APRIL 6, 2010

Defendants.

The matters of the parties' cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment came
before the Court for argument on February 11, 2010, at the conclusion of which the
Court took both motions under advisement. The parties agree that for purposes of
these motions, there are no facts in dispute, and each seeks a declaration of Daniel
Pearson's employment status when he was Assistant Police Chief employed by the City
of South Jordan. Having considered the parties' written submissions and the
arguments of counsel, the motions are ready for decision.
The undisputed material facts are as follows: Mr. Pearson held the position
Assistant Police Chief of the City of South Jordan ("South Jordan"). On January 30,
2007, City Manager Rick Horst terminated Mr. Pearson's employment, citing his at-will
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status pursuant to Utah statute. The Chief of Police and the Assistant City Manager
affirmed this decision, as did the City Employee Appeals Board.
This case turns upon the construction of Utah Code section 10-3-1105, which
provides:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge . . . only as
provided in Section 10-3-1106.1
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department
who is a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city;
( c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
.(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; or
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(I) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
If Mr. Pearson's job is one of those identified in subsection (2), he is an at-will employee
with none of the protections afforded by another portion of the Code.
Mr. Pearson argues that the statute unambiguously identifies specific positions
which are excluded from the procedural protections afforded merit employees.
Because his position was "Assistant Police Chief," a title not on the list, he was not an
at-will employee and therefore could not be terminated except pursuant to Section 103-1106.

Section 10-3-1106 provides various safeguards and procedural mechanisms for
appealing adverse action.
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

South Jordan contends the statute is ambiguous because the word "deputy
police chief is subject to more than one interpretation. Because of that ostensible
ambiguity, it urges the Court to look to the facts, and determine that the position
Assistant Police Chief "equates to and is the same as a "deputy police chief."
Additionally, it argues that "a deputy of a head of a municipal department" would also
encompass Mr. Pearson's job.
In determining the meaning of a statute, a court looks to its words, giving them
their plain and ordinary meaning. The words are assumed to have their common and
customary meaning and are considered within the context of the statute, interpreting
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters. A statute is
ambiguous if its language has more than one meaning. Only when the language of the
statute is ambiguous may the Court look further to determine legislative intent.
The word "deputy" is defined as "a person appointed as a substitute with power
to act," and "a second in command or assistant who usually takes charge when his or
her superior is absent." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11 th ed.). The word
"assistant" is a person who assists, a helper. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deputy"
as "[a] substitute; a person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of the
functions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the latter." As these terms
are commonly understood, an assistant is "one who assists," whereas a deputy is "A
person named or empowered to act for another." The word "deputy" thus encompasses
someone not only who assists someone else, but someone who, with greater authority,
may conduct the business of another. From an organizational standpoint, other
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portions of the Code suggest that the distinction has hierarchical implications.2
Accordingly, while there are some similarities in the meanings of these terms, they are
not interchangeable, but are separate and distinct, and the Court does not in the
context of this statute find that the word "deputy" is ambiguous.
That the Legislature intended to distinguish the two is evident in subsection (f),
which identifies as an at-will position that of "a deputy or assistant fire chief." If the
words "deputy" and "assistant" were synonymous, then the use of the word "assistant"
in this subsection of the statute is redundant and superfluous. The Court assumes that
the statute's use of the word "assistant" in this context is advised and meaningful, and
that its omission in subsection (d) is correspondingly meaningful. Interpreting the
statute in the manner urged by South Jordan would be to insert language into
subsection (d) that isn't there.
Elsewhere South Jordan suggests that the Court consider Mr. Pearson's role as
second-in-command as the equivalent of "deputy police chief," but here again, if this
was the Legislature's intent, it could have added language to that phrase, such as
"deputy police chief or its functional equivalent" The fact that it did not is meaningful.
Moreover, because the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the Court cannot
engage in the factual analysis and policy analysis urged by South Jordan.
South Jordan also urges the Court to construe subsection (h)-which applies to "a
deputy of a head of a municipal department"- as a catch-all provision which includes
Mr. Pearson's title and position. But this is to read a redundancy into the statute, and to

2

See e.g. Utah Code § 10-3-1002(3).
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render meaningless the distinctions among most of the other subsections. In any
event, the Court finds no ambiguity in the use of the word deputy in this context.
Because Mr. Pearson's position is not one of those identified in subsection (2),
his employment may be terminated only as provided in section 10-3-1106. That section
establishes some protections for employees-for example, by prohibiting their discharge
based upon politics or religion-and establishes a procedure for seeking administrative
review of adverse actions. In other words, the position is not simply at-will.
Counsel for Mr. Pearson is directed to draft a proposed form of partial summary
judgment and to submit it to the Court at an appropriate time consistent with the
provisions of Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this ^ d a v 0 f A y T V ^

, 2010.

A
KATE A. TOOME

[UJCKJt^

F COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 090914481 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: CHAD D NOAKES 341 SOUTH MAIN STREET STE 3 03 SALT LAKE CITY,
UT 84111
MAIL: JUDITH D WOLFERTS 10 EXCHANGE PLACE \lTH FLR POB 450 00 SALT
LAKE CITY UT 84145-5000

Date:
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Deputy Court Clerk
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